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analyzed in order to verify an expected increase in overall system efficiency and 
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The Navy has a limited ability to evaluate the kill effectiveness of a HEL Combat 
System. A ship’s onboard sensors such as radar, cameras, and personnel, along with off 
board sensors like helicopters, combat air patrols and other warships in the Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) provide the Navy’s current kill assessment capability. These 
sensors combine to provide a Common Operational Picture (COP) for situational 
awareness, and this picture encapsulates the threat kill assessment data. In this setting, an 
asymmetric threat like a swarm attack may overwhelm a ship’s organic sensors, which 
means that the ship may not be able to maintain the near real-time situational awareness 
needed to defend the ship. The RAND Corporation defines asymmetric warfare as 
“conflicts between nations or groups that have disparate military capabilities and 
strategies” (RAND 2015). Furthermore, swarm describes a tactic where “small 
distributed units and maneuverable fires converge rapidly on particular targets” and this 
“scheme of maneuver involves the convergent attack of five (or more) semi-autonomous 
(or autonomous) units on a targeted force” (Edwards 2000, 1–2). Five or more threats 
converging on a single ship simultaneously at a rapid rate is a challenging problem for a 
combat management system. The challenge of engaging a swarm attack with ship’s 
weapons like a Close in Weapon System (CIWS) and a HEL adds another challenge 
because a Navy warship has finite resources of power and ammunition available to 
combat the incoming threats. Understanding this problem developed into a desire to 
maximize the employment of the finite weapon resources in order to maximize the 
number of kills for a combat management system. 
To maximize the number of kills achieved by a HEL during a swarm attack 
required a systems engineering analysis of laser weapon system designs and equations. A 
battle damage assessment capability to limit engagement time, or “dwell time,” by 
calculating the time required for the HEL beam to lase the target in order to defeat the 
threat seemed feasible using probability of kill and lethal fluence. 
  This concept coupled with the definition of a mission kill could increase the kill 
effectiveness of a HEL threat engagement. The desire to provide a control mechanism 
 xix 
using battle damage assessment to limit the dwell time of the HEL for a mission kill 
became the focus of the project’s conceptual development and systems engineering (SE) 
analysis for a new kill assessment capability intended for operations against asymmetric 
threats. Such a control mechanism could potentially increase the combat system 
engagement performance, and thereby, increase the survivability of the ship.  
In order to better understand whether or not a BDA system was the solution to the 
swarm threat capability gap, the following key research question became the focus of the 
systems engineering investigation: Does a HEL Combat System with a BDA system 
provide more kills than a HEL Combat System without a BDA system, given a threat 
scenario or scenarios? 
This research question required tailored SE and systems analysis approaches in 
order to arrive at an answer within a nine-month project schedule. The selected SE 
process was Vitech’s Top-Down Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) method, 
and the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DODAF) was the standard for 
creating the systems architecture. The SE concept of operations (CONOPS) provided a 
basis for the system requirements, architecture and model. This BDA system concept 
developed through modeling and simulation (M&S) was not designed for a specific ship 
platform. This approach was intended to enable the application of the project solution and 
recommendations to any shipboard combat system.  
The BOE and ExtendSim M&S tools were used for the BDA system analysis and 
proof of concept. The M&S approach included selected operational scenarios and open 
source data to establish the threat and shipboard weapons data. Using an Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA), the threat types and ship weapon types were selected. Baseline ship 
weapons were narrowed down to one HEL and one CIWS due to system complexity and 
project schedule. The four asymmetric swarm threat types selected for the scenarios were 
Fast Attack Craft (FAC), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Combat Aerial 
Vehicles (UCAVs), and Anti-Ship Missiles (ASMs). The primary threat scenario selected 
for the model was a swarm attack of all threats in order to stress the system. 
 xx 
The primary tool selected for the M&S approach was the BOE model in 
Microsoft Excel. ExtendSim was selected as the tool to develop a software model to 
check the BOE data. The Shipboard HEL 2011 capstone team developed an HEL 
ExtendSim model that was used as the starting point for the M&S effort of this project.  
The BOE analysis clearly supported the recommendation for the integration of a 
BDA capability. Eight unique scenarios were run 1000 times each to generate an 
adequate sample for analysis. 50 random threats were used as the inputs to the four 
unique scenarios. Scenarios 1 and 2 contained one HEL and one CIWS and Scenarios 3 
and 4 contained two HEL and two CIWS. Scenarios 2 and 4 removed missiles from the 
threat set. A HEL Combat System with BDA showed an average kill improvement of 
33%, which exceeds the 25% improvement threshold. This proof of concept provides the 
U.S. Navy with a credible starting point and methodology for further system performance 
analysis with a more robust model representative of the system interfaces. 













1 1 1 Off All 37 29 1 1 On All 
2 1 1 Off UAV, UCAV, Boat 37 34 1 1 On UAV, UCAV, Boat 
3 2 2 Off All 32 17 2 2 On All 
4 2 2 Off UAV, UCAV, Boat 26 4 2 2 On UAV, UCAV, Boat 
Average Improvement 33 21 
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On 12 October 2000, the USS Cole (DDG-67) was in the harbor in Aden, Yemen 
when suicide bombers attacked the ship riding an explosive-laden small boat. The 
resulting explosion killed 17 and injured 39 sailors. The preliminary estimate of repair 
cost was $243 million and ultimately required 14 months to complete. During this time a 
national asset was unavailable for international security tasking. The cost of mounting 
this attack was infinitesimal compared to the cost to the Department of Defense (DOD) 
and U.S. national security. The low cost of asymmetric warfare had a large impact to the 
national defense budget, the availability of assets for national tasking, and more 
importantly the lives of American service women and men. The story of the USS Cole 
speaks volumes because the asymmetric threat accomplished an effective mission kill 
with only one small explosive boat. The Navy’s ability to maintain freedom of navigation 
and perform operations in the littorals depends on an ability to counter such asymmetric 
threats with effective, low-cost weapons like laser weapon systems (Perl and O’Rourke  
2001, 1–2).  
Existing combat systems detect, track and engage a threat. Employing laser 
weapons in this combat system framework is challenging because of the speed of 
engagement, necessary power and cooling resources, and variable weapon dwell time 
required to defeat multiple naval threats. These naval threats have a wide spectrum of 
speed and survivability. For instance, missile systems have faster closure rates but are 
structurally more fragile compared to surface systems such as small boats, which 
approach slowly but are more difficult to disable or destroy. Potential adversaries have 
the ability to overwhelm legacy combat systems with low-cost, high-density weapons 
such as UAV, swarm attacks, ASMs, and suicide attacks by air or sea. With this 
information in mind, a solution to effectively use a HEL Combat System against known 
threats for maximum ship survivability needed to be determined and analyzed.  
 1 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Maritime threats can overwhelm Navy combat systems and thus pose a threat to 
Naval ship survivability with low-cost, high-density weapons. Therefore, a solution to the 
problem of effectively utilizing the HEL Combat System to achieve a maximum level of 
kills was explored. A HEL Combat System is an effective, sustainable, low-cost solution 
against asymmetric maritime threats since electrical power is the source of ammunition in 
a Solid State Laser (SSL). The team developed a concept for a BDA system that could be 
integrated as a subsystem into the HEL Combat System in order to provide a valid 
method to effectively employ the HEL from a shipboard combat system. An analysis of 
such a subsystem required a CONOPS and a predictive mathematical model that 
incorporates a set of threat scenarios, required fluence to defeat those threats, the cycle 
time of the HEL weapon and an architectural framework through which to incorporate 
BDA into the combat system. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The technology readiness of some HEL weapons is increasing. “HEL weapons are 
currently making a transition from the laboratory to the battlefield. In doing so, all 
constraints on weapon-system effectives (sic) must be honestly evaluated” (Perram et al. 
2010, 61). With this in mind, the following research questions were considered: 
1. Based the threat scenarios in the proof of concept, against what type(s) of 
threats will the HEL Combat System be the most effective? 
2. How is dwell time calculated for a HEL, and how can this time be 
optimized for the HEL Combat System? 
3. What are the expected cost benefits of implementing the BDA system?  
4. Does a HEL Combat System with a BDA system provide more kills than a 
HEL Combat System without a BDA system, given a threat scenario or 
scenarios? 
5. How would the BDA system be integrated into an existing HEL Combat 
System? 
D. CURRENT STATE OF HEL ON SURFACE SHIPS 
HEL weapons are progressing towards implementation on certain Navy vessels 
because they are proving to be an effective weapon against threats in complex, austere 
AORs such as the Persian Gulf. The USS Ponce recently underwent sea trials for the 
 2 
Laser Weapon System (LaWS) and was authorized to maintain the weapon onboard for 
threat mitigation (Lendon 2014). The Office of Naval Research (ONR) Rear Admiral 
Klunder said “The captain of that ship has all of the authorities necessary if there was a 
threat inbound to that ship to protect our sailors and Marines (and) we would defend that 
ship with that laser system. It would be (used) against those (unmanned aerial vehicles), 
slow moving helicopters, (and) fast patrol craft” (LaGrone 2014). The success of the 
LaWS program testing onboard the USS Ponce demonstrates that laser weapons are 
quickly becoming integrated on surface ships to counter enemy threats.  
1. HEL Maritime Threat 
Multiple short-range maritime threats are eligible for HEL engagement. As was 
noted in the LaWS testing onboard the USS Ponce, the threat types tested for engagement 
were UAVs and fast patrol craft (Lendon 2014). These threats are the types that are cause 
for concern in the Persian Gulf. 
2. Surface Ship HELs 
The Department of Defense continues to focus on the technological development 
of specific directed energy weapon types for military operations, which include chemical 
lasers, solid-state lasers (SSLs) and free electron lasers (FELs) (Perram et al. 2010, 5). 
Laser weapons classified as solid-state include continuously cooled lasers, heat-capacity 
lasers and fiber lasers (Perram et al. 2010, 14). The LaWS is one implementation of a 
fiber solid-state laser that was successfully tested onboard the USS Ponce in the summer 
of 2014 and approved for operational use (see Figure 1). According to Ronald O’Rourke, 
a specialist in naval affairs, “a fiber SSL first uses high power semiconductor laser diodes 
to convert electricity into light. The light then passes through one or more glass optic 
fibers that contain a small amount of a deliberately introduced impurity or ‘dopant’ 
material (O’Rourke 2014, 34). This combination of light and dopant changes the 
wavelength and concentrates the energy into a narrow beam through the fibers (O’Rourke 
2014, 34). In special designs, multiple fibers are combined incoherently (out of phase) to 
create one powerful beam of energy. The LaWS generates its beam by combining six 
fiber SSLs incoherently to provide a total power of 33 kW, a wavelength of 1.064 
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microns, and a beam quality of 17 (O’Rourke 2014, 34). The goal of the LaWS program 
was to “maximize reliance on existing technology and components so as to minimize 
development and procurement costs” (O’Rourke 2014, 34). 
 
Figure 1.  U.S. Navy LaWS (from U.S. Naval Institute 2014) 
The Maritime Laser Demonstrator MLD is a slab SSL that was developed under 
DOD’s Joint High Power SSL program as a rapid demonstration (O’Rourke 2014, 11). 
Similar to the LaWS, MLD combines lasers to form one powerful beam. Instead of 
incoherent fiber SSLs, the MLD combines seven slab SSLs to generate a beam with a 
total power of about 105 kW, which is more than three times that of the LaWS 
(O’Rourke 2014, 11). This system has undergone multiple maritime test events for the 
Navy and successfully engaged a small boat in April 2011 (O’Rourke 2014, 11). 
Following MLD testing, a Navy report determined that the DDG and LCS classes were 
the most opportune ships to install a SSL weapon system (O’Rourke 2014, 17). Based on 
this information, SSLs are the optimal laser type for shipboard use and a few SSL types 
are currently undergoing successful maritime operational testing. 
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 The Free Electron Laser (FEL) is a different laser type than the SSL because of 
its unique operation. Electrons move through a vacuum while magnets cause them to emit 
light (Perram et al. 2010, 5). The benefits of FELs are the wavelengths can be tuned to a 
desired wavelength for atmospheric transmission sweet spots and power can be scaled up 
to megawatt power levels to counter a wider range of targets (O’Rourke 2014, 24). 
However, the FEL is not yet a viable option for the Navy because is the system is 
currently too large for military applications (Harney 2013c, 1035). 
 
Figure 2.  Free Electron Laser (from Jefferson Lab News 2006) 
Since the LaWS was used in the performance study High Energy Laser 
Technology for Navy Surface Combatants, and since it is the only directed energy 
weapon system to be approved for operational use on a U.S. Navy ship, the USS Ponce, 
the HEL selected for this capstone study is the LaWS (Richard et al. 2011). 
E. CURRENT STATE OF BDA ON SURFACE SHIPS 
BDA or kill assessment is performed rudimentarily using visual and kinematic 
data. This information is vital to the weapon system in order to stop the engagement 
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activity when a sufficient kill is achieved, which will save any remaining ammunition for 
subsequent threat engagements. As an example, the CIWS is a stand-alone system that 
can stop its engagement of a target based on threat kinematic data. The CIWS uses a 
“shoot-look-shoot” criterion for engagement. Using this logic as a data feedback can 
certainly provide a means for efficiently using a HEL weapon. 
F. PROJECT GOALS AND INITIAL PROJECT TECHNICAL RISK 
The goal of this project was to answer the five research questions and add to the 
body of knowledge for shipboard HEL weapon systems. The technical risks of this 
project included the ability to properly model the HEL Combat System with a BDA 
subsystem and a HEL Combat System without a BDA subsystem. Since the focus is on 
weapon-target pairing and not the complete HEL weapon system functionality, scope 
selection and system boundaries were critical to the SE analysis approach.  
G. PROJECT REPORT OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides a review of existing literature in the field of naval high-energy 
laser employment. Chapter III describes the SE approach for conceptualizing and 
analyzing the HEL BDA system and developing a systems architecture for the model. 
Chapter IV covers the M&S approach for the HEL BDA concept. Chapter V provides the 
analysis and conclusions from the model. Chapter VI discusses the HEL BDA system 
integration into the model and an analysis of integrating this new capability on existing 
ship platforms. Finally, Chapter VII is the conclusion of the report, which offers the 
project results and recommendations for additional research. 
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II. LITERATURE AND REFERENCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To establish an unclassified report for the evaluation of a HEL Combat System, 
the data used for system analysis had to come from open source documentation. Since 
directed energy, or beam weapons have been imagined for centuries, there were quite a 
few open source documents and articles available for reference. Advisors provided 
valuable combat system references and the Internet offered open source data for threat 
and shipboard weapon analysis. The first step in open source analysis was to determine 
why directed energy weapons are desired for military applications and then collect any 
open source references available for evaluation of a HEL Combat System with the 
integration of a new BDA system. 
B. WHY HIGH ENERGY LASERS? 
Lasers offer several advantages over conventional naval weapons, chief among 
them being their near-speed-of-light propagation, long line-of-sight range, very large 
effective magazine capacity (subject to ship’s power and cooling) and low cost per shot. 
While there are many advantages, there are also many risks to the development of laser 
weapons for employment on maritime platforms. In 2001 the Defense Science Board 
(DSB) Task Force on High Energy Laser Weapons Systems Applications concluded, 
“HEL systems are an area of technological advantage that can be exploited by the United 
States” but “the United States has underfunded basic and exploratory development 
research on high-energy laser technologies” (Welch and Latham 2001, 6–7). 
Testing of the Airborne Laser (ABL) seemed to pave the way for military 
applications of directed energy weapons. The ABL program was in development around 
2001 using a megawatt-class chemical oxygen-iodine laser (COIL) aboard a Boeing 747–
400F aircraft to counter theater ballistic missiles (Perram et al. 2010, 344–345). Testing 
continued for several years and finally the system had its first successful engagement of a 
boosting ballistic missile on 11 February 2010 (Missile Defense Agency 2014). Now five 
years later, the LaWS testing proved successful against short/mid-range maritime threats 
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such as UAVs and small boats onboard the USS Ponce. With authorization to keep the 
LaWS on the ship as a defensive weapon, the USS Ponce paved the way for directed 
energy weapon employment on surface ships (Lendon 2014). “Based on progress to date, 
the Navy could have a fully capable laser weapon deployed within a decade” according to 
Daniel Goure, Ph.D. (Goure 2014, 1). With this supporting knowledge, the available open 
source references for concept development and system analysis were explored. 
C. AVAILABLE LITERATURE FOR HEL WEAPONS 
Implementation of high-energy lasers on a layered ship self-defense system 
provides a method to counter high-density, low-cost threats with an effective, low-cost 
countermeasure. Dr. Daniel Goure wrote in The Next U.S. Asymmetric Advantage:  
Maritime Lasers to Counter the A2/AD Challenge: 
The United States Navy is confronted by an expanding array of both 
qualitative and quantitative threats to its ability to conduct its fundamental 
missions of forward presence, sea control, power projection ashore and 
defense of the global commons. The proliferation of advanced, long-range 
ASMs, particularly when coupled to a robust C4ISR system, is 
complicating operational planning and could, in the event of hostilities, 
deny the Navy the ability to operate in critical areas of the world’s oceans. 
Even individually less capable threats such as fast attack craft and armed 
unmanned aerial vehicles could seriously drain inventories of defensive 
weapons. (Goure 2014, 1) 
An important research document for the evaluation of a military HEL Combat 
System is Ronald O’Rourke’s “Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile 
Defense: Background and Issues for Congress” (O’Rourke 2014). The body of the 
document discusses the advantages and disadvantages of deploying lasers aboard naval 
vessels and the appendices describe the proposed laser types that have been considered 
thus far in detail. In the area of BDA research, the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) 
Joint Warfighting Center published the “Commander’s Handbook for Joint Battle 
Damage Assessment” to elucidate the BDA process. “This handbook is not intended to be 
authoritative, but is offered as a supplement to extant BDA doctrine. BDA is composed 
of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system 
assessment.”  This publication also provides the various types of intelligence information 
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that weapons platforms employ to determine the effectiveness of engagement (OSD Joint 
BDA 2004). The three BDA phases described include:  
Phase I—Physical Damage Assessment: Phase I BDA “estimates the 
quantitative extent of physical damage (through munitions blast, 
fragmentation, and/or fire damage effects) to a target resulting from the 
application of military force” (DIA DI 2820–4-03; BDA Quick Guide). 
Phase II—Functional Damage Assessment: Phase II BDA “estimates the 
effect of military force on degrading/ destroying the functional or 
operational capability of the target to perform its intended mission. The 
level of success is based upon the operational objectives established 
against the target” (Joint Targeting School, Combat Assessment Student 
Guide). 
Phase III—Target System Assessment: Phase III BDA is “an estimate of 
the overall impact of force employment against an adversary target 
system” (Air Force Publication: 14–210; USAF Intelligence Targeting 
Guide). 
While this reference provided BDA definitions, a specific methodology for a 
shipboard HEL engagement could not be found. However, using additional references 
such as Introduction to Laser Weapon Systems by Glen P. Perram et al. and Effects of 
Directed Energy Weapons by Philip E. Nielsen, a BDA methodology was determined for 
analysis. Furthermore, these references also provided information regarding the 
atmospheric effects of directed energy weapons, including those of a maritime 
environment. 
D. SUMMARY 
The literature does not address the subject of BDA methodology for a HEL 
Combat System specifically; however, there is sufficient information by which a BDA 
methodology can be derived. 
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III. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE 
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
The systems engineering process started with understanding the stakeholder needs 
and translating them into system requirements for the system design. The result of the 
systems engineering approach in this chapter was the development of an operational view 
(OV) diagram, CONOPS and the system requirements. To reach this outcome, Vitech’s 
Top-Down MBSE methodology is used to create the systems engineering products. 
The systems engineering methodology used to develop the BDA system was a 
modified “top down” approach depicted in Figure 3 (Muehlbach 2014a, 26). Steps 0 and 
1 were completed using an evaluation of stakeholder needs, CONOPS definition and 
system requirements development. Steps 2 through 8 were completed using architecture 
diagrams including context diagrams, functional flow block diagrams, and IDEF0 
diagrams. Step 9 was the model and simulation design of the BDA system and Step 10 
was the analysis of the model and simulation data, which included a systems integration 
analysis. Steps 11 and 12 are not applicable because actual system development is not 
part of the project. The capstone report and the BDA system model fulfill Step 13 of 
Vitech’s Top Down MBSE process. Using this approach from the view of the overall 
combat system identified the location and function of the new BDA system to understand 
the data interactions, functions and interfaces required to develop a proof of concept. 
B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Step 0 of the Vitech’s Top Down MBSE Process is “Define Need and System 
Concept.” A stakeholder analysis was performed in order to identify the BDA system 
need or requirement, which is also known as the primary function that the BDA system 
must accomplish. A primary function is necessary to develop an operational view of the 
BDA concept and a set of system requirements. The process to generate the system 
requirement included identifying stakeholders, identifying stakeholder needs and 




Figure 3.  Vitech’s Top Down MBSE Process (after Muehlbach 2014d)  
1. Methodology 
The Raytheon SSDS Program, NPS Systems Engineering Department and Naval 
Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Directed Energy were engaged early in the project. The 
ONR, Code 35 Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) department was also contacted during 
the first few months to provide their input. The methodologies used to contact 
stakeholders included in-person meetings, online sessions, emails and phone calls. The 
needs and requirements were compiled for analysis to determine the priority of the 
stakeholder requirements. A pairwise analysis was selected as the analysis method to 
prioritize stakeholder requirements. 
2. Stakeholder Requirements 
The project Stakeholders listed in Table 1 are categorized as active and passive 
stakeholders. Active stakeholders described those that were engaged in requirements 
development, project scope, peer reviews and Interim Project Reviews (IPRs). The 
Raytheon SSDS Program Office and the Systems Engineering Department at NPS were 
the active project stakeholders. 
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The HEL BDA team held meetings with available stakeholders to obtain 
stakeholder requirements. Raytheon’s SSDS Program Office, the Systems Engineering 
Department at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the ONR, and the Direct Energy 
Program Office at NSWC: Port Hueneme were contacted and utilized to provide input for 
the requirements analysis. During team meetings with the primary project stakeholders at 
Raytheon, a definitive project scope and technical need were achieved. The Raytheon 
stakeholders described a need for a BDA capability on a ship combat system.  
3. Identify Needs 
At the outset of this project, a meeting was held with Raytheon lead engineers in 
order to determine gaps or needs in a shipboard combat system. Immediately, the need 
for a BDA capability came up in the discussion and was identified as a technical problem 
that lacked a systems engineering solution. The team determined that this was a need that 
could be applied to a combat system with an HEL. With this project scope in mind, a 
design concept could add to the body of knowledge of shipboard combat systems as well 
as DEW. A follow-on meeting with ONR stakeholders from Code 35 Directed Energy 
Weapons provided a great opportunity to share the project scope and goals and to also 
receive input for the employment of the HEL BDA concept. Project advisors each 
supported the systems engineering process of the capstone project and held weekly 
meetings with the HEL BDA team.  
4. Stakeholder Analysis and Requirements 
The team leveraged an AHP pair-wise comparison analysis to identify the priority of 
stakeholder needs for the BDA system (Manalo et al. 2014). An AHP pair-wise 
comparison is a tool used for weighting several criteria two criteria at a time 
(Triantaphyllou and Mann 1995). This mathematical tool is a great method to decide 
which system top-level functional requirements are the most important to create the 
system design. This information is provided through weights of importance that are 
output from the AHP pair-wise tool. Using an input weighted system of each requirement 
with stakeholder rankings of either a 3 or 4 for low and high importance out of the group 
of requirements, the output is automatically generated. In this manner, the tool provides a 
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rank of the top-level functional requirements amongst the list of requirements by 
normalizing each pairing to one. A great example of the AHP pair-wise analysis is found 
in the International Journal of Industrial Engineering: Applications and Practice, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, pp. 35–44, 1995 in the article titled “Using the Analytic Hierarchy Process for 
Decision Making in Engineering Applications: Some Challenges.” Along with the output 
weightings is a bar graph that provides a view of the final rankings or weights of the five 
main stakeholder requirements for the BDA system.  




Stakeholder Category Goal/Need 
Raytheon SSDS Program 
Office Active 
Develop additional Battle Damage Assessment 
(BDA) capability for the Ship Self Defense 
System and integrate the High Energy Laser 
(HEL) 
Systems Engineering Dept., 
Naval Postgraduate School Active 
Employ a Systems Engineering process to 
develop additional Battle Damage Assessment 
(BDA) capability for the U.S. Navy Combat 
Systems and integrate the High Energy Laser 
(HEL) 
Office of Naval Research Passive Provide information for swarm/UAV raids 
Navy Program Office, Aegis Passive 
Provide oversight and input for updates to the 
Aegis to incorporate BDA algorithms and 
CONOPS 
Navy Program Office, SSDS Passive 
Provide oversight and input for updates to the 
SSDS to incorporate BDA algorithms and 
CONOPS 
Navy Program Office, HEL Passive 
Provide additional High Energy Laser 
capabilities and integration information for use 
in the analysis of BDA with respect to HEL 
employment 
Navy Combat Systems 
Operators Passive 
Clear CONOPS and training for the use of the 
HEL and BDA in U.S. Navy Combat Systems 
Navy Combat Systems 
Maintainers Passive 
Maintenance information for the HEL and BDA 
integrated with U.S. Navy Combat Systems 
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The functional capabilities for the BDA system collected from the stakeholders 
include: 
1. Determine battle damage for the HEL and other weapon/threat pairs. 
2. Calculate dwell time for each weapon system. 
3. Be reliable. 
4. Be available. 
5. Be integrated in a Navy shipboard HEL Combat System. 
These five functional capabilities were ranked with the help of Raytheon 
stakeholders. This set of rankings was used as the input to the pairwise analysis and are 
summarized in Table 2. The highlighted numbers show the low and high stakeholder 
weights for each system requirement. 
Table 2.   Stakeholder Requirements Weighting (after Manalo et al. 2014) 
Top-Level System Requirements Weights 
Increase the kill 
effectiveness of the HEL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Determine battle damage 
for the HEL and other 
weapon/threat pairs 
Increase the kill 
effectiveness of the HEL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Calculate dwell time for 
each weapon system 
Increase the kill 
effectiveness of the HEL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Be reliable 
Increase the kill 
effectiveness of the HEL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Be available 
Increase the kill 
effectiveness of the HEL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Be integrated in a Navy 
shipboard HEL combat 
system 
 
These rankings are put into the input blocks (coordinates [1, 2], [1, 3], [1, 4], and 
[1, 5]) of the pairwise graph in Figure 5, which serves as a tool to weigh the requirements 
amongst each other to determine a ranking output. This tool accomplishes this function 
by comparing the relative value of all requirements then yielding a weighting factor to 
each one through pairing, which is the origin of the term pair-wise. After inputting the 
data from Table 2 into the AHP pair-wise comparison spreadsheet, the weights for the 
top-level requirements were viewed in the bar graph shown in Figure 4. The highest 
weighted requirement among the five requirements was “Determine battle damage for the 
 15 
HEL and other weapon/threat pairs” as shown in Figure 4. This requirement became the 
focus of the project. 
 
Figure 4.  AHP Pair-Wise Requirement Weights 
While all five BDA system functional requirements are important to the project, 
this analysis helped the team focus on the correct requirement and narrowed the project 
scope. Figure 5 below provides the pairwise analysis performed by the Systems 
Engineering team. 
5. Stakeholder Conclusion 
The stakeholders identified the need for a BDA capability in a shipboard combat 
system. The BDA requirements were developed using the stakeholder requirements for 
the new battle damage assessment or weapon/threat evaluation capability using a 
pairwise analysis. This analysis used stakeholder weights for each requirement to yield a 
priority list of stakeholder requirements. Project stakeholders effectively communicated 
the technical need and their project requirements, which were compiled and analyzed to 
achieve the key requirement for the project. 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
Accurately determine battle damage
for the HEL and other weapon/threat
pairs








Figure 5.  Pairwise Analysis of Stakeholder Needs 
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
With the BDA system need defined, the system concept was developed as part of 
Vitech’s Top Down MBSE Process Step 0. There are two key functions of the BDA 
system. First is a near real time BDA to improve the HEL lase time and number of threat 
kills. The second is calculating the predicted dwell times for weapon/threat pairs to 
achieve optimal combat system weapon selection for effective and efficient threat 
engagements. With a capability to determine when a threat is neutralized, the weapon 
dwell time on a target could be minimized. This allowed the weapon platform to enter its 
cool down cycle sooner and therefore be ready to engage a new target earlier than the 






























































































Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 Weights
Accurately determine battle 
damage for the HEL and other 
weapon/threat pairs 1 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 0.4615
Accurately calculate dwell time for 
each weapon system 2 0.33 1.00 1.33 1.33 1.00 0.1538
Be Reliable 3 0.25 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.1154
Be Available 4 0.25 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.1154
Be integrated in a Navy shipboard 
HEL Combat System 5 0.33 1.00 1.33 1.33 1.00 0.1538
0.46 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.15 1.0000
Check
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weapon could fill in current naval capabilities. The section concludes with an overview of 
the CONOPS that explores the applicability of BDA and HEL to selected threat 
scenarios. 
1. Capability Gap 
Combinations of new and old technologies have redefined naval surface warfare 
in the 21st century. Less concerned with developing expensive blue water fleets, naval 
powers of the world have pivoted toward the littorals. Coastal combat gives a number of 
advantages to the nearby host nation. A scenario of particular concern while operating in 
the littorals of a hostile region is the swarm attack, which overwhelms a naval force with 
large numbers of high speed, relatively low-cost, deadly threats. Combinations of FAC, 
UAVs and ASMs pose threats that can quickly exhaust and overwhelm a ship’s defensive 
weapons capabilities. Current defense systems are quickly exhausted and cost much more 
than the threats they would engage in hostile littoral regions. 
Another capability gap that the BDA system fills for a HEL Combat System is the 
need for automation. To achieve reduced manning requires an allocation of a function 
previously performed by software. By providing the option for the HEL to receive near 
real-time BDA during a threat engagement, the HEL weapon with an EO/IR sensor can 
behave as a stand-alone system with autonomous fires, much like the CIWS. This could 
potentially reduce manning costs for operation and provide another mode of operation for 
the swarm engagement doctrine. In the case of the LaWS tested on USS Ponce, the HEL 
interfaced with the navigation radar and the CIWS. It was also operated independently by 
operators via an operating station in the combat information center (LaGrone 2014). An 
automatic mode for a fiber SSL like the LaWS will likely handle a larger number of 
threats and possibly remove the need for a separate operating console with a specialized 
operator.  
2. Geographic Locations 
The majority of world commerce travels via sea lines of communication (SLOC). 
Nation-states that depend on this commerce have expended considerable resources in 
order to guarantee their own and their trading partners’ access to the seas, particularly 
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narrow chokepoints that connect major bodies of water. The Strait of Gibraltar, Bab-el-
Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, and Strait of Malacca are strategic chokepoints of ever-
present concern. The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway through which most of the 
global petroleum travels by sea (USEIA 2014). 
Because of the proximity of transiting ships to hostile coastlines, coastal defense 
cruise missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft and fast (inshore) attack craft can launch 
surprise attacks that will overwhelm legacy kinetic defense systems.  
a. Narrow Naval Corridors 
Hostile littoral regions are the starting point for the HEL BDA CONOPS. Narrow 
sea lanes, straits or choke points are key characteristics of the sea based economic super 
highways. For Example, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide at its narrowest point and 
it transports a larger volume of crude oil and petroleum products than any other strait in 
the world (USEIA 2014). These narrow sea-lanes are areas of vulnerability because of the 
close vicinity of land which results in reduced maneuverability and sensor/weapons 
posture restrictions. Table 3 lists the busiest chokepoints in the world for the transport of 
oil products (USEIA 2014). 
Upon further investigation of the Straits of Hormuz and the surrounding threats, 
Iranian forces have the potential to be the most daunting. Based on geographic research, 
Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb are Iranian-controlled islands from which 
attacks can be launched with little to no warning (USEIA 2014). An Iran and U.S. order 
of battle is depicted in Figure 6 with a great depth of force on each side (Johnson 2012). 
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Table 3.   Volume of Crude Oil Transit Through Strategic Chokepoints (from 
USEIA 2014) 
Volume of crude oil and petroleum products .transported through world 
chokepoints, 2009–13. (estimates in millions of barrels per day) 
Location 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Strait of Hormuz 15.7 15.9 17.0 16.9 17.0 
Strait of Malacca 13.5 14.5 14.6 15.1 15.2 
Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline 3.0 3.1 3.8 4.5 4.6 
Bab el-Mandeb 2.9 2.7 3.4 3.7 3.8 
Danish Straits 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.3 
Turkish Straits 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.9 
Panama Canal 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Total Chokepoints 41.7 42.9 45.9 47.0 47.6 
World maritime oil trade 53.9 55.5 55.6 56.7 56.5 
Percentage through chokepoints 77.4% 77.3% 82.6% 82.9% 84.2% 
 
b. Self-Defense Considerations 
HEL weapons systems would augment, but not replace, legacy self-defense 
systems. The layered carrier air defense begins at the limit of its organic and inorganic 
sensor range to detect incoming threats. Interceptor aircraft provide the first layer of 
active defense, operating within and extending the sensor envelope, seeking first to 
engage striking aircraft and any inbound missiles immediately after launch. 
Aegis ships provide a missile engagement zone (MEZ), behind the fighter 
engagement zone (FEZ), in which they can engage aircraft and missiles that survive the 
first layer. Standard missiles engage targets at ranges up to 100 nautical miles and speeds 
greater than 2.5 IMN (1650 knots), theoretically allowing for multiple attacks against a 
single inbound missile; however, cruise missiles typically closely follow the terrain, in 
this case the sea surface, and therefore quickly drop below the Aegis radar (SPY-1) 
horizon.  
The final layer of defense is individual ships’ point defense systems, currently 
composed of the CIWS, rolling airframe missile (RAM), 5”/54 deck gun on cruisers (CG) 
and destroyers (DDG). HEL weapons systems with BDA could be incorporated into the 
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existing combat systems to provide additional defensive capability against missile swarm 
attacks that overwhelm legacy weapons (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, III-7). 
A key capability gap with both Standard missiles and gun-based weapons is their 
limited magazine capacity. Laser weapons systems do not have a conventional magazine 
and are instead limited by their ability to create the laser beam. Solid-state lasers 
represent the additional advantage of reducing the quantity of hazardous materials 
required on board because they replace conventional high-explosive munitions and lase 
without dangerous chemicals as in a chemical laser. 
 
Figure 6.  Iran and U.S. Order of Battle (from Johnson 2012) 
3. Potential Threats  
As depicted in Figure 6, Iran has a layered offensive capability that includes Anti-
ship cruise missiles (ASCM), Helicopters/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and patrol 
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boats or Fast (Inshore) Attack Craft (FAC/FIAC). HEL BDA may be an asset to the 
defense of the ship and her crew against such attacks over a baseline HEL Combat 
System. The speed, range, radar cross section, elevation, guidance system, weapon load-
out and construction material of a threat must all be considered in order to prioritize the 
threats, schedule weapons and define the battle damage criteria for a mission kill with the 
HEL.  
a. Missile Threat 
Table 4 gives specific characteristics of the Exocet and C-802 missiles. These 
missiles have capabilities similar to other missile threats observed in naval combat. From 
an operational standpoint, these missiles would generally be launched from a naval or 
land-based system outside of the range of short or mid-range defense systems. 






Exocet AM.39 0.93 IMN 65 km (35 NM) 165 kg 
C-802 0.9 IMN 120 km (65 NM) 165 kg 
 
Smaller missiles, with lower fuel stores and smaller explosive yield, may be 
launched from UAVs and FACs. Missiles launched from UAVs generally travel fast and 
in straight lines. Disabling these threats requires kinetic impact to cause aerodynamic 
instability and weakening of the frame of the missile. Stress produced by aerodynamic 
instability causes a compromise in the structure of the missile and cascades into the 
projectile breaking itself apart. High Energy Lasers operate under a similar concept as 
kinetic impact, but instead it softens the missile frame through the application of heat. 
Lower levels of energy tuned to the appropriate wavelength also provide a capability to 
destroy sensor systems on a missile. This reduced amount of dwell time to achieve a 
mission kill of a missile means that the available energy can be used to engage more 
missile targets. Similarly, UAVs can be engaged by a HEL to achieve a mission kill. 
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b. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Threat 
UAVs are relatively soft targets. Few countries actually operate drones that are on 
par with the Predator and Global Hawk. Combined with a swarm attack of various 
weapons, these less capable drones could present a significant offensive threat to surface 
vessels. Stealth capability has not yet been realized, so UAVs rely on their ability to 
station themselves well above the range of most weapons except surface to air missiles. 
Surface combatants with a Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) or higher variant can engage 
targets at altitudes greater than 100,000 feet but they are very expensive countermeasures 
for this threat type (Davis et al. 2014, 1–4). To conserve long-range missiles and mitigate 
cost, a closer weapon engagement is desired, making UAVs a primary target for a HEL 
weapon. Two recent tests of a Boeing High-Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator 
(HELMD) at White Sands Missile Range and Eglin Air Force Base featured 150 
successful engagements of airborne targets, including UAVs, with a 10 kW ground 
vehicle-mounted laser. The deployed LaWS also successfully engaged UAVs 
demonstrating that UAVs are prime targets for laser weapon systems.  
 
Figure 7.  UAV Threat (from NASA 2014) 
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c. Fast/Inshore Attack Craft Threat  
Surface threats range in capabilities from Fast attack/fast inshore attack craft 
(FAC/FIAC) with simple rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIB) carrying small arms, Multiple 
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and explosives, to small warships such as corvettes, 
patrol boats and missile boats with heavy weapons. Table 5 lists known Iranian surface 
threats and their respective capabilities. 
Table 5.   Iranian Fast Attack Craft (from Open Source Intelligence Project 
2011, 26–49) 
Class Category Speed 
(knots) 
Armament 
Alvand Corvette 39 C-802 “Noor” ASM; 324 mm torpedoes 
Mowj Corvette 28 
C-802 “Noor” ASM; 324 
mm torpedoes; 76mm Fajr-
27 Naval Gun 
Kaman/Sina Missile Craft  36 C-802 “Noor” ASM;76 mm OTO-Melara Naval Gun 
IPS-18 TIR Torpedo Craft  52 533 mm torpedoes; C-802 “Noor”ASM 
Paykaap (IPS-16) Torpedo Craft 52 324 mm torpedoes 
Bavar (IPS-16) Missile Craft  52 C-701 “Kowsar” ASM 
Zolfaghar (IPS-16) Missile Craft  52 C-704 “Nasr” ASM 
C-14 China Cat Missile/MLRS Craft  55 TL-10 or C-701 or C-704 ASM; 122mm MLRS 
FB RIB-33 MLRS Craft  57 107 mm MLRS 
FB MIL-40 MLRS Craft  62 107 mm MLRS 
FB MIL-55 Mine/MLRS Craft  68 107 mm MLRS; mines 
Ashura MLRS Craft  45 107 mm MLRS; mines 
Kajami Submersible Craft 40 324 mm torpedoes 
 
According to the “IRGCN Small Boat Tactics” from Office of Naval Intelligence: 
Unlike IRIN tactics-founded on conventional naval operations during the 
days of the Shah—the IRGCN’s tactics have grown from a combination of 
irregular warfare and ground force principles. Although the IRGCN has 
existed for more than 25 years-growing significantly more professional 
and structured during that time it has eschewed a conventional approach to 
naval warfare in favor of asymmetric tactics and principles of irregular 
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warfare. The results have been adaptable tactics that leverage surprise, 
speed, maneuverability, mass, and deception, and which ultimately 
manifest themselves in hit-and-run style attacks. Although public 
statements from Iranian leadership routinely emphasize their “new” style 
of conducting asymmetric warfare at sea, IRGCN small boat tactics are 
neither new nor original but are typical of historical small boat warfare 
tactics. Thus, in seeking to understand the types of tactics used by the 
IRGCN, a review of the basic principles and tactics of small boat warfare 
is essential. (ONI 2009) 
Within the geographic region of the Persian Gulf, Iran possesses one of the largest 
littoral combat fleets. Table 6 is an open-source estimate of available Iranian warships 
and missile boats from 2010 (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011; Wertheim 2013). 
The table does not include patrol ships, hovercrafts, submarines, and hundreds of MLRS 
or mine laying attack crafts, so this list is just a small sample size of the entire fleet of 
small boats. The data proves that Iran certainly has the capability to present a large 
swarm threat of fast attack craft in this theater of operations. 
Small boat swarm threats are well within the effective range of a HEL. While a 
single Phalanx CIWS mount will exhaust its 1550-round magazine after approximately 
20–30 seconds, HELs have a flexible magazine capacity since it is determined by the 
ship’s power generation capability. The ammunition is in the form electricity created by 
generators that are powered by fuel. This is the same liquid fuel used by the LPD 17 San 
Antonio Class to power its five 2500 kW diesel generators (NavSource Online 2015). As 
a comparison, there are three 2500 kW gas turbine generators on the DDG 51 Arleigh 
Burke Class (U.S. Navy 2015) and 4 generator sets on the DDG 1000 Zumwalt Class 
destroyers (Navsea 2015) that are all powered by the same fuel. Fuel is more convenient 
to manage than kinetic ammunition, such as missiles since fuel is easily replaced during 
underway replenishment as fuel transfer. This “HEL ammunition” fuel does not require 
special storage or handling beyond the holding tanks that are already onboard to meet the 
ship’s propulsion and power generation requirements. This large shot capacity and low 
cost per shot makes the HEL a great candidate to close the capability gap against 
asymmetric swarm threats that include UAVs or FAC/FIAC. 
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Table 6.   Estimated Quantity of Iranian Corvettes and Torpedo/Missile 
Boats (from Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 13) 





















Mk 13 10 
Tarlan 14 
Dalaam 2 
 Total: 138 
 
4. Threat Countermeasures  
The U.S. Navy uses a broad range of weapons to counter potential maritime 
threats. Direct shipboard countermeasures can be grouped into three generic categories to 
include long, medium and short-range defense. Long-range threats are typically engaged 
by long-range surface to air missile systems. Medium-range missiles or big-deck guns 
counter medium-range threats, and finally a wall of ammunition defeats short-range 
threats by systems like the Phalanx CIWS. The CONOPS considers a typical weapons 
configuration for a surface combatant including long-range, medium-range and short-
range weapons.  
a. Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS) 
CIWS was initially developed as a last resort, automated defense system to 
counter ASMs. This weapon was developed in the 1970s to counter Cold War-era threats. 
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Recent upgrades address the capability gap for ship survivability against asymmetric and 
littoral threats. Block 1 improvements added computer systems capable of tracking and 
targeting missiles exercising advanced maneuvers. Block 1B added a Surface Mode that 
increased the effectiveness against surface targets by adding a Forward Looking Infrared 
(FLIR) sensor. CIWS does have its disadvantages, such as accuracy and ammunition 
magazine limitations, however it is used as a weapon of last resort so a wall of 
ammunition is exactly the desired effect. In this manner, it is a very effective short-range 
weapon (Pike 2014). 
 
Figure 8.  Phalanx CIWS (from MurdocOnline 2006) 
b. High Energy Laser (HEL)  
 HELs are a maturing technology that challenges the traditional kinetic weapon 
kill method. Current prototypes, such as the Laser Weapons System (LaWS) shown in 
Figure 10 demonstrate the effectiveness of this system as a maritime defense capability. 
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A HEL uses power produced by the ship’s diesel generators, main generators or its own 
power source. In the case of the LaWS, the system is “powered and cooled by a diesel 
generator independent of the ship’s electrical framework” (Stratfor Global Intelligence 
2014). Inherently designed with high availability, the depth of the HEL’s magazine can 
be measured by the ship’s electrical power generation and cooling capacity. 
Because DEWs require a substantial amount of power, a navy vessel is the ideal 
test platform to support the space, weight and power (SWaP) requirements of a HEL. 
Clearly, larger ships such as amphibious ships are optimal for HEL installation due to the 
larger size and space available to support the weapon system. While there are many 
advantages to a maritime HEL, the issue of beam attenuation or extinction in the 
maritime environment must be overcome. A maritime environment creates natural 
atmospheric effects on the HEL energy beam, such as absorption, scattering and 
turbulence that have to be overcome for trusted performance and reliability during threat 
engagements (Perram et al. 2010, 209). As the HEL system continues to mature in 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) it has already proven to be beneficial against short-
range threats during testing on the USS Ponce.  
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Figure 9.  U.S. Navy LaWS (from Stratfor Global Intelligence 2014) 
c. HEL in the Shipboard Layered Defense 
Current Navy strategy uses a layered defense model to manage threat 
engagements. Figure 10 shows the layered defense concept in terms of sensor and 
weapon capability ranges in the BOE model. The SPQ-9B has a nominal range of 
approximately 36 km to provide early threat detection (GlobalSecurity.org 2011c). The 
detected targets from the SPQ-9B are viewed by the EO/IR sensor at a maximum of 20 
km for Recognition processing per Johnson’s Criteria, which allows the target to be 
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engaged by the HEL (GlobalSecurity.org 2011c; Harney 2013c). Next, the weapon 
systems from short/mid-range (HEL) to short-range (CIWS) provide the final two layers 
around the amphibious transport dock (LPD) for ship self-defense. 
 
Figure 10.  BOE Model Sensor/Weapon Layered Defense Concept (after U.S. 
Navy 2008) 
The missile threat is the closest threat at the start of the threat scenario followed 
by the UAV/UCAV and finally the small boat threats. The combined BOE simulation 
data for Threat Scenarios 1–4 provided encouraging data that the BDA system concept 
definitely adds significant value to the HEL Combat System and is worthy of further 
research and development. 
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Figure 11.  HEL Engagement Ranges (after U.S. Navy 2008) 
Similarly, the HEL engagement of the four different threat types in the simulation 
provided another layered defense concept of the HEL’s threat engagement process. Using 
the BOE model for the range and height data, this chart provides an excellent snapshot of 
the beginning of the HEL engagement ranges in Figure 11. This knowledge provides a 
basis for the HEL BDA CONOPS and OV-1 diagram.  
5. Operational View 
Operational View One (OV-1), in Figure 12, details how a kill assessment system 
may support a quick and efficient engagement of multiple targets in swarm attack 
scenarios. In order to accomplish this, the BDA system must integrate with three major 
systems on the ship: sensors, the combat direction system, and the weapon systems must 
be able to exchange information in order to realize optimization. BDA would likely 
reside within the combat direction system to not only receive necessary data for 
calculations but also to provide the near real-time kill assessment back to the combat 
system for weapon-threat engagement efficiency. 
Detection systems from the weapons platforms, HEL optics and shipboard radar 
platforms combine to give high fidelity intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) capabilities. This capability provides tracking of azimuth, range, elevation and 
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identification of the target. Automatic identification by the combat system is an 
increasingly useful capability in that it allows rapid determination of the ideal weapon-
target pairing to counter a threat, the required engagement time (dwell time) and real-time 
assessment of criteria for successful target neutralization criteria. Light detection and 
ranging  (LIDAR), laser rangefinders and other sensors provide high fidelity close range 
tracking while radar platforms provide long-range tracking including over-the-horizon 
(OTH) via networked systems to nearby ships, aircraft and land-based systems such as 
Link-16/Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) (Northrup Grumman 
2013, 2–3) and Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) (U.S. Navy 2013). The 
optical systems of HEL are inherently high-resolution telescopes, providing line-of-sight 
detection that can bridge the gap between visual and long-range sensors without 
additional equipment. Information from detection systems should provide enough 
information to achieve an effective target profile. This threat information is critical for a 
combat management system to intercept and defeat an incoming threat. 
 
Figure 12.  HEL BDA OV-1 (after U.S. Navy 2004, 2008 and 2012) 
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Combat systems identify, prioritize and schedule threats to be defeated by 
appropriate weapon platforms. By integrating a BDA system, combat systems gain an 
extra capability to determine the immediate threat to the ship based on target data and 
kinematics. For example, target types that are hardened against a HEL should be 
identified by the BDA system. This data will cause the combat system to schedule the 
threat to the CIWS by the combat system. In general, BDA will use target data and BDA 
criteria for a weapon-threat pair to provide input to the combat system’s weapon-threat 
scheduling function. 
 BDA provides inputs to the combat system to maximize probability of kill (Pk) 
and increase the total number of kills. HEL has unique opportunities for engagement 
management in that its lasing can be appropriately stopped when no longer necessary. 
Advanced optics and detection platforms allow the HEL to reduce its lasing time by 
recognizing the signs of a mission kill. The most practical mission kill for a laser 
generally results from fatigue in metal due to heat absorption. This softening of the 
exterior in fast moving objects results in significant structural stress due to aerodynamic 
instability. Such stresses generally break apart the target resulting in an explosion or the 
object breaking apart. Other mission (soft) kills may result from sensor blinding (Perram 
et al. 2010, 332). Boats may experience mission kills through a decrease in velocity or an 
onboard fire. Recognizing these failure modes by threat type will allow the laser to stop 
lasing and enter its cool down cycle. Unlike the HEL, the BDA system is not effective for 
a CIWS. 
Test data determined that the CIWS cannot implement BDA because the travel 
time for rounds from the CIWS to impact the target is extremely short. By the time the 
leading edge of the salvo reaches the target, the CIWS has stopped firing (Pike 2003).  
The BDA system employs modern sensors, recognition algorithms and threat type 
mission kill data to defend surface combatants. Combat systems, and even specific 
weapon platforms such as the HEL, inherit an increase in engagement efficiency and 
effectiveness with at BDA system. This helps to adapt maturing technologies for naval 
combat in the present operational environment. This new capability allows ships to 
mitigate more threats for the same amount of power. 
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6. Summary 
Current and future areas of operation require new weapon effectors and 
engagement techniques to counter relatively inexpensive and disposable asymmetric 
threat types. In order to provide mission assurance in hostile littoral operating areas, a 
new BDA capability paired with the unique capabilities of innovative weapon systems, 
such as the Laser Weapon System may fill critical capability gaps. With the concept of 
operations defined, the system requirements for the BDA system could be developed. 
D. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
Step 1 of the Vitech’s Top Down MBSE Process is “Capture and Analyze 
Original Requirements”; therefore, the next step in the systems engineering process was 
the development of the BDA system requirements. Requirements drive the design needs 
for the HEL BDA system and provide links between the BDA system, combat system, 
weapon systems and detection systems on the ship platform. Requirements drive the 
development of further architectural diagrams, the M&S, systems integration approach 
and systems analysis method. 
1. Methodology 
Blanchard and Fabrycky’s Systems Engineering and Analysis text states that the 
requirements drive the operational concept by defining the needs necessary to fulfill the 
mission concept. These needs include the mission’s definition, performance and physical 
parameters, operational deployment or distribution, operational life cycle, utilization 
requirements, effectiveness factors, and environmental factors. These needs are 
developed early, carefully, and as completely as possible (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2006, 
61).  
Developed requirements are used to create a set of Key Performance Parameters 
(KPPs) that would be used to help shape BDA integration needs and details for the model 
and simulation conducted at the core of this project. At the end of the BDA Analysis and 
completion of the M&S phase, requirements are revisited to ensure all objectives and 
requirements are fulfilled.  
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2. Requirements Analysis 
Requirements have been broken down into four major categories: Weapon 
System, Shipboard Platform, Combat System, and Detection System. The tables that 
follow provide the BDA system requirements. Requirements 1.3.1 through 1.3.6 were 
used to develop the M&S requirements in Chapter IV. 
3. Requirements 
Requirements were broken down into several sections and subsections as in 
Tables 7 through 13 below. These requirements outline the needs to appropriately design 
the software simulation of a Navy surface engagement. 
a. Weapon System Requirements 
Table 7.   Weapons System Requirements—CIWS 




















1.1.1.1 Probability of Kill 
CIWS shall have a probability of kill for a CIWS engagement per threat 
type.  
1.1.1.2 Maximum Range 
CIWS shall have a maximum range of 3,500 meters. 
1.1.1.3 Minimum Range 
CIWS shall have a minimum range of zero meters. 
1.1.1.4 Ammunition Capacity 
CIWS shall be restricted to a maximum of 1,500 rounds of ammunition. 
1.1.1.5 Targeting Inputs 
CIWS shall receive target data from the combat system in order to allow for 
platform precision targeting of a threat.  
1.1.1.6 Targeting Outputs 
CIWS shall be capable of outputting successful or unsuccessful engagement 












Table 8.   Weapons System Requirements—ESSM 
































1.1.2.1 Probability of Kill 
ESSM shall have a probability of kill for an ESSM engagement per threat 
type. 
1.1.2.2 Maximum Range 
ESSM shall have a maximum range of 50,000m. 
1.1.2.3 Minimum Range 
ESSM shall have a minimum range of 1,463m. 
1.1.2.4 Ammunition Capacity 
ESSM shall have scalable ammunition count adjustable by the user. 
1.1.2.5 Targeting Inputs 
ESSM shall receive target data from the combat system in order to allow for 
platform precision targeting of threat. 
1.1.2.6 Targeting Outputs 
ESSM shall be capable of outputting successful or unsuccessful engagement 




Table 9.   Weapons System Requirements—HEL  




















1.1.3.1 Probability of Kill 
HEL shall have a probability of kill for a HEL engagement per threat type. 
1.1.3.2 Maximum Range 
HEL shall have a maximum range of 10,000m. 
1.1.3.3 Minimum Range 
HEL shall have a minimum range of 250m. 
1.1.3.4 Dwell Time 
HEL shall control the dwell time on target to destroy or disable each threat 
type 
1.1.3.5 Cycle Time 
HEL thermal dissipation, energy generation and storage shall be 
sufficiently large enough to engage large volumes of threats.  
1.1.3.6 EO/IR  
HEL shall utilize EO/IR Sensor to track targets. 
1.1.3.7 Input Power Requirements  
HEL shall have a maximum input power requirement of 1 Megawatt  
1.1.3.8 Output Power Requirements  
HEL shall have a minimum output power requirement of 10% Efficiency. 
1.1.3.9 HEL Inputs 
Inputs shall be received from combat system in order to allow for platform 
precision targeting of threat. 
1.1.3.10 HEL Outputs 
HEL shall send engagement data to the BDA system in order to allow for 
analysis of engagement dwell time and to determine the number of 
successful kills. 
1.3.11 HEL Outputs 
  
HEL shall send engagement data to the Combat System in order to 
determine the number of successful kills. 
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b. Combat System Requirements 
Table 10.   Combat System Requirements 














1.2.2 Determine Target Priority 
The Combat System shall determine a target priority list using organic systems. 
1.2.3 Weapon-Target Assignment (Scheduling) 
The Combat System shall schedule available weapons to the target priority list with 
BDA input. 
1.2.4 Target Data 
The Combat System shall receive threat data from organic sensors in order to 
determine target type.  
1.2.5 Target Data 
The Combat System shall send threat data to BDA, CIWS and HEL systems. 
 1.2.7 Updated Dwell Time 
The Combat System shall use the updated dwell time from BDA to schedule weapons 
for mission kills. 
c. BDA System Requirements 
Table 11.   BDA System Requirements 












 1.3.1 Kill Analysis 
BDA shall determine an effective mission kill of a threat based on data gathered 
from organic and inorganic sensors.    
1.3.2 Dwell Time 
BDA shall determine dwell time for individual weapon systems based on the target 
profile from organic sensors. This Dwell time can be used to assist the combat 
system in assigning weapon systems to a threat. 
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Table 12.   Detection System Requirements 














1.4.1 Target Heading 
Onboard detection systems shall detect target heading  
1.4.2 Target Speed 
Onboard detection systems shall detect target speed  
1.4.3 Radar Cross Section 
Onboard detection systems shall detect the target radar cross section  
1.4.4 Target Profile 
Onboard detection systems shall provide data to shipboard systems in order to 
support the identification of threat types  
1.4.5 Radar Range 
Nominal radar range shall be 20 nm (36,576 meters) 
1.4.6 EO/IR Range 
Nominal EO/IR range shall be 20,000 meters 
Table 13.   Analysis and Model and Simulation Requirements 


















1.5.1  Scalability 
Models generated shall be capable of being scaled to incorporate weapon systems, 
threats, and scenarios. 
1.5.2 Variety of Weapon Systems 
Model shall model a layered defense scheme.  
1.5.3 Simulation Effectiveness 
Model shall measure statistics from the engagements that can later be used to 
conduct an analysis of HEL Combat System effectiveness.  
1.5.4 Input Data 
Model inputs shall be open source, unclassified data. 
1.5.5 Data Analysis 
Model outputs shall provide time-based data for graphical analysis of the HEL 
Combat System performance 
1.5.7 Recommendations  
The Model and Simulation shall provide data for analysis to determine a 
recommendation to either include BDA or not to include BDA on a HEL Combat 
System  
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E. SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE 
1. Purpose and Methodology 
Step 3 of Vitech’s Top Down MBSE Process diagram is “Capture Originating 
Architecture Constraints” (Muehlbach 2014a). With the requirements established, the 
next step was to create architecture diagrams in order to understand the architecture 
constraints of the system, derive integrated system behavior, derive component hierarchy, 
allocate behavior to components and define internal interfaces, which are steps 4–8 in 
Vitech’s Top Down MBSE Process in Figure 3.  
2. OV-1 Diagram 
The DODAF OV provides an understanding of system operations through specific 
actors and provides a description of the tasks, activities, operational elements, and 
information flows that are necessary to accomplish system operations (Dam 2006, 38). 
The OV-1 diagram provided in Figure 12 graphically defines the OV of a shipboard HEL 
Combat System with a BDA capability. This OV is a picture view of the system; 
therefore, it is an effective starting point to convey the purpose, actors, interactions and 
operational environment of the system in a manner that is easy understand. 
3. Context Diagram 
To better understand the intended use and scope of the BDA system as depicted 
by the OV-1 diagram, a Combat System context diagram was generated. A context 
diagram is a diagram that defines the boundary between the system, or parts of a system, 
and its environment. This diagram includes the system interfaces and the general 
information that is passed between interfaces (Dam 2006, 145). Figure 13 is the Combat 
System context diagram for this project. In the context diagram, the Combat System is 
the central system with connections to external interfaces called Sensor Suite, Threat, 
Weapon Systems and HEL and connected to internal interfaces called BDA and Dwell 
Time. Initially the central system of the context diagram was a ship system as a whole, 
however, that diagram did not provide a low-level context to define where the BDA and 
Dwell Time existed. Changing the central system to the Combat System provided the 
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context needed to understand where and how the BDA systems would exist and interact 
on a HEL Combat System. 
 
Figure 13.  Combat System Context Diagram 
All information in the battlespace cannot be transformed into useful data for the 
combat system to use for targeting threats. The sensor capabilities and limitations 
represent a technological filter insofar as each specific system only samples a portion of 
the electromagnetic spectrum. Furthermore, whether the sensor is a passive detector or an 
active system, raw inputs must meet an internal detection threshold for that sensor to 
create a track file in the command and control system. Sensor input that does not meet 
this threshold falls out due to the processing filter. Additional filtering occurs at the 
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operator level due to perceptual, cognitive, and imaginative bias of the man-in-the-loop. 
Figure 14 provides a simple view of this data filtering concept (Harney 2013a, 14). 
 
Figure 14.  Data Filtering Process (from Harney 2013a, 14) 
a. Weapon Systems 
Some examples of the weapons on a given ship platform include the ESSM, 
Mk35 Gun Weapon System and the CIWS. The “weapon output” data line from weapon 
systems to the threat indicates the weapon-threat engagement. Data to the combat system 
from the weapon system is the weapon system status message. Data passed from the 
combat system to the weapon system is the combat system solution with could include 
items such as the weapon-threat pairing, the fire control solution, and threat data. Figure 
15 defines the basic combat system fire control loop to show the interaction between the 
weapon system and the combat system (control block) for target engagement. 
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Figure 15.  Combat System Fire Control (from Harney 2013a, 7) 
b. Threat 
Threats include those discussed in section C of Chapter III. These threats are 
initially detected as contacts by the ship’s sensor suite and then given a threat designator 
in the combat system by either Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) or other source. 
c. Sensors 
Sensors are the external systems required to detect and track contacts. Common 
radars and sensors may include the SPQ-9, SPS-73, SPS-48, EO/IR sensors, LADAR, 
etc. 
d. High Energy Laser 
 The selected architecture is a point-defense system incorporating HEL and 
Phalanx CIWS; the HEL is the primary weapon system selected to combat threat 
scenarios. The HEL is separated from the other weapon systems because it is the focus of 
the analysis and is the primary weapon system selected for the combat system. The 
purpose of the BDA function is to provide a dwell time solution and kill assessment tool 
for the HEL threat engagement that will allow a combat system to make effective HEL 
engagements and offer a decision point to either re-engage the target or to attack a new 
target. In order to design this concept in the selected architecture, a Combat System 
FFBD was required as a starting point. 
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4. BDA Context Diagram 
Development of the BDA Context Diagram to link requirements to the BDA 
system architecture followed definition of the Combat System Context Diagram. Figure 
16 is the BDA Context Diagram. 
 
Figure 16.  BDA Context Diagram 
5. Combat System Functional Flow Block Diagram 
A FFBD is a multi-tier, time-sequenced, step-by-step diagram of a system’s 
functional flow. This is also known as the OV-5 or Operational Activity Model in 
DODAF (Dam 2006, 47). Figure 17 below is the Combat System FFBD that was 
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designed based on our primary Stakeholders’ defined needs and system requirements. In 
sequential order, this flow diagram shows the functions from the time that the target is 
detected until the time that the target is disengaged. This FFBD provided a functional 
context view of three new functions: Predict Probability of Kill, Predict Dwell Time, and 
Determine BDA, which are designated with a black, bold outline. It was important to 
understand where these functions would exist within the combat system functionality.  
 
Figure 17.  Combat System FFBD 
a. Combat System FFBD Functions 
The FFBD begins with detecting all tracks in a specific track/turn window. 
Track/turn windows are used to detect, organize and analyze multiple tracks within a 
complex, dynamic battlespace. Tracks in the window are analyzed for a plethora of data. 
The bearing, range, elevation and other track data supports a friend/foe designation and 
threat type designation (UAV, small boat, or missile). Following this determination, the 
combat system prioritizes the threats for optimal ship survivability. This prioritization 
function is the input to predictions for the Probability of Kill and Dwell Time of each 
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threat and weapon pair. With this input data, the combat system obtains a weapon and 
sensor status in order to schedule the available weapons and engage the threat. During the 
threat engagement, the combat system monitors the Track/Turn Window and the target 
Debris while determining a BDA. This combination of parallel functions is used as a 
decision point by the Combat System to either reengage the target or engage the next 
scheduled target(s). The system functions are identified in italics. 
6. Predict Probability of Kill and Dwell Time FFBD 
Based on the Combat Systems FFBD the prediction of Probability of Kill and 
Dwell Time are key functions in the system of systems (SoS) architecture. Figure 18 is a 
decomposed FFBD of the prediction of Probability of Kill and Dwell Time functions. The 
combat system prioritizes the threats and this function contains the threat profiles. This 
threat data received from the combat system is used to simultaneously predict the 
Probability of Kill and Dwell Time and this data is used by the combat system to schedule 
available weapons. The system functions are identified in italics. 
 
Figure 18.  Predict Probability of Kill and Predict Dwell Time FFBD 
a. A0 Top Level Function Diagram 
Another helpful architecture view is a top-level functional diagram, similar to 
IDEF0 (Dam 2006, 110). Figure 19 depicts the decomposition of the A0 Top Level 
Function Diagram for the Predict Probability of Kill/Dwell Time functions. This diagram 
shows the inputs, outputs, mechanisms and controls affecting a system function. The 
functions are the same as the FFBD but designated as A1, A2 and A3. Function A1 
receives Threat Data and Threat Profile Criteria and provides the Threat Type as an 
output. Threat Profile Criteria and Threat Type are data inputs for the A2 function 
Predict Probability of Kill that provides the Pk as an output. The Pk plus the Threat Profile 
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Criteria and Threat Data are inputs to the Predict Dwell Time calculation, which outputs 
the Predicted Dwell Time. 
 
Figure 19.  A0 Top Level Function Diagram 
b. Lower Level Function Diagrams 
The following figures, Figures 20, 21, and 22, further decompose the A1-A3 
functions in the A0 Top Level Function Diagram in sequential order. Decomposing the 
functions provided a means to further analyze the data required for each function at the 
next lowest level. Understanding the data interactions supported the M&S effort. 
Within A1, function A11 compares the Threat Data and Threat Profile Criteria to 
a database of known threat data to correctly identify a threat with a high level of 
probability. The identified threat type is stored into a database in function A12. 
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The Probability of Kill sub-functions are similar to the A1 sub-functions with a 
storage function. The sub-functions are not complex but straightforward. Conversely, the 
decomposition of A3 is far more complex. 
In order to calculate predicted dwell time there are three functions that are 
performed simultaneously. These functions consist of the Baseline Dwell Calculation, 
Calculate Atmospheric Effects and Calculate Elevation/Range Adjustments. All three 
calculations provide input to function A34 Calculate Predicted Dwell Time. The Predict 
Dwell Time data is stored in a database and also provided as an output to the next 
function block. 
 
Figure 20.  Receive Threat Profile Decomposition 
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Figure 21.  Predict Probability of Kill Decomposition 
 
Figure 22.  Predict Dwell Time Decomposition 
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7. Determine BDA Functional Flow Block Diagram 
The next new function is Determine BDA. The related functions are provided in 
the FFBD defined in Figure 23 below. The first function Receive Threat Schedule with 
Weapon Assignments is data provided from the combat system. Using this input data, the 
Assign Battle Damage Criteria function assigns a damage assessment method to the 
weapon-threat pair. After the BDA criterion is assigned, updated data from ship sensors 
and radars is received in the Receive Threat Monitoring Data function. From here, the 
system Calculates BDA and then Sends BDA analysis to a decision point where the 
system either continues to engage the threat or disengages the threat. Disengage Threats 
is the next main combat system function per the FFBD depicted in Figure 18. The system 
functions are identified in italics in the paragraph. 
 
Figure 23.  Determine BDA FFBD 
a. A0 Top Level Function Diagram 
A diagram of the inputs, outputs, mechanisms and controls for the top-level 
functions was deemed critical to develop the M&S of the BDA functionality. Figure 24 
shows the first level decomposition of A0 Top Level Function Diagram for the 
Determine BDA. The top-level functions are Assign Battle Damage Criteria, Calculate 
Battle Damage Assessment and Send Battle Damage Assessment. 
 50 
Function A1 receives the Threat and Weapon Pairing data and uses the Battle 
Damage Database to output the Battle Damage Criteria Assignment for the given threat-
weapon pair(s). In order to Calculate BDA, the BDA Assignment and Updated Target 
Information are the required inputs, the Predicted Dwell Time and the Battle Damage 
Database are external controls and mechanisms, respectively. The Predicted Dwell Time 
comes from function A3 Predict Dwell Time. The BDA output is the input to Send BDA, 
which provides the BDA Output Messages. 
 
Figure 24.  A0 Top Level Function Diagram 
b. Lower Level Function Diagrams 
To further understand the functions that support a BDA determination, the lower 
level diagrams for the three major functions were developed and analyzed. This 
supported the M&S effort for system analysis. 
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In Figure 25, the threat and weapon pairing information will be sent to A11 from 
the combat system. Using a BDA database for threat/weapon pairs, battle damage criteria 
are assigned to the given threat-weapon pair(s) and sent as an output to function A2. 
 
Figure 25.  Assign Battle Damage Criteria Decomposition 
Function A2 is Calculate Battle Damage Assessment, which is further 
decomposed to Compute Visual Damage and Compute Kinematic Change (see Figure 
26). These functions occur simultaneously using the Target Data as a control. Onboard 
ship sensors such as radar, LIDAR, cameras and personnel provide physical damage 
assessment and kinematic change is best detected by a LIDAR or radar. Such sensors also 
provide the target data to the BDA system. Both of these assessments are provided as 
inputs to Calculate Battle Damage along with a third input called Battle Damage Criteria 
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Figure 26.  Calculate BDA Decomposition 
Assignment, which is provided by function A11. Calculate Battle Damage also has a 
mechanism from the Battle Damage Database to support the BDA determination and a 
control called Predicted Dwell Time from A3 Predict Dwell Time function. This allows 
the BDA output to include the Dwell Time from the weapon-threat engagement for 
greater computational accuracy.  
The BDA is stored for off-ship engineering analysis. Function A31 provides a 
notification called BDA Stored to function A32 Distribute Battle Damage Info, which 
distributes the BDA data in the form of BDA Output Messages (see Figure 27).  
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Figure 27.  Send Battle Damage Assessment Decomposition 
F. SUMMARY 
The system architectural methodology used was the “top down” process from 
DODAF. An OV-1 diagram of the system was illustrated to show the purpose, actors, 
interactions and operational environment of the system in a manner that is easy 
understand. A context diagram was provided to better understand the Combat System and 
BDA system. The FFBDs provided a blueprint for each individual function within a 
system. From the system FFBDs, top level and lower level functional diagrams were 
created. These diagrams included inputs outputs controls and mechanisms that helped 
understand its functions. These diagrams were used to create the BOE model for proof of 
concept of the BDA system. 
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IV. MODELING AND SIMULATION APPROACH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The next step in the systems engineering process is Step 9, which is “Select 
Design” per Vitech’s Top Down MBSE Process. The design approach is M&S to achieve 
a proof of concept of the BDA system. This key step in the systems engineering process 
included the code design and the system model and simulation development.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used for system verification was M&S methods. Selecting both 
methods was sufficient for a Proof of Concept approach. For Systems Engineers coding 
can be a challenging task unless engineers have experience with coding in the selected 
M&S tools. This detail provided considerable justification for the selection of 
mathematical M&S tools used for system verification and validation. Based on the team 
experience, stakeholder input and advisor input, an Excel BOE and ExtendSim were the 
M&S tools selected for this important step in the SE process.  
1. Model FFBD 
The approach for the model code design was based a flow diagram designated in 
Figure 28. This flow diagram provided a high level, visual path forward to build the 
M&S code in Excel and ExtendSim. 
 
Figure 28.  Model FFBD for Code Design 
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In leveraging the Model FFBD, the next step was to build an Excel model to use 
as a baseline. This baseline model provided an M&S solution with a high level of detail 
for the follow on system analysis. It also provided a means to compare data from the 
Excel Model with the data from the ExtendSim Model. Data comparisons are a good 
approach to ensure verification of the models. The baseline model developed in Excel 
will be referred to as the BOE model. 
C. BACK-OF-THE-ENVELOPE MODEL 
A back-of-the-envelope (BOE) model is a mathematical modeling technique to 
model discrete events for simulation. For example, in SE3250, Capability Engineering, 
the class designed a BOE for the “Defense of High Value Targets from Missile Attack” 
(Pawlowski et al. 2013). This model actually included a similar approach as the HEL 
BDA solution because of the ship combat scenario against a known set of threats and a 
given set of countermeasures. The SE3250 model provided a solid technical approach for 
the HEL BDA baseline model.  
1. Basic Model Structure 
The BOE model was created to simulate results of 50 random threats attacking a 
ship with layered defenses. The model has the capability to use ESSM, HEL and CIWS 
to defend itself. For the purposes of this analysis the missile capability was turned off in 
order to more closely approximate the installation on a ship like the LPD 17 class which 
does not have vertical launch capability (U.S. Navy 2014a). Combatants such as DDG 51 
and DDG 1000 classes (U.S. Navy 2014c) have VLS with large complements of SM-2 
interceptor missiles. Figure 29 shows the basic flow through the model. Initially 50 
threats of random type are created. These threats can be any of the following:  missile, 
UAV, UCAV and boat. The selection of the data for each of these threat types is detailed 
in section D.2. After the threats are created the distance to the ship is determined using 
the basic radar equation and the threat radar cross section (RCS). The engagement 
priority for each threat is determined and then they are sorted based on that priority. The 
threats are then engaged first with the HEL and then with the CIWS if the HEL misses or 
cannot engage due to a time limitation. 
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Figure 29.  BOE Model Flow 
2. Setting Variables and BOE Data 
Multiple variables were required for the BOE model. Appendix C contains data 
used in the BOE model, including variables, threat data and ship countermeasures data. 
An AoA was performed on the threat data and ship countermeasures data in order to 
complete the variables for the BOE model. All data referenced in Appendix C is open 
source data. 
a. Threat Data Analysis of Alternatives for BOE Model 
The threat types that were decided upon to represent long-range, mid-range and 
short-range threats from the CONOPS, which included ASMs, UAVs, UCAVs and small 
boats (FAC/FIAC) in the Persian Gulf theater of operation. The following key threat 
attributes or variables were analyzed for alternatives: 
• Speed (meters per second) 
• Range (meters) 
Based on the research contained in Appendix A, specific threat types were 
identified to complete the set of variables in the BOE model. The alternatives discovered 
for each threat type are provided in Table 14. 
Table 14.   Threat Type Options for BOE Model 
Threat Type #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
ASMs Noor-2 
(C-802) 
Kosar  Nasr Harpoon   















(1) Anti-Ship Missile Selection 
Data for the ASM threats was compiled into Table 15 and analyzed for 
implementation in the model. According to a House of Representatives Report, the C-802 
anti-ship cruise missiles are “a threat to our national security” and “place the safety and 
security of American servicemen and women stationed in the Persian Gulf theater of 
operations at risk” due to their sea-skimming and nearly-supersonic capabilities (U.S. 
House 1997, 1). 
In November 1996, Iran conducted land, sea and air war games in the 
Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman and successfully test- fired a C–802 
anti-ship cruise missile from one of its patrol boats. Admiral Scott Redd, 
the former commander-in-chief of the United States Fifth Fleet stationed 
in the Gulf, said that the C–802 missiles give Iran a “360-degree threat 
which can come at you from basically anywhere.” Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Robert Einhorn told the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee on April 11, 1997, that the C–802 cruise missiles “pose new, 
direct threats to deployed United States forces. (U.S. House 1997, 2) 
Based on this research, the Iranian Noor-2/Chinese C-802 missile was selected as 
the ASCM to implement in the model. 
Table 15.   Anti-Ship Missile Data (after Open Source Intelligence Project 
2011, 70–75) 
ASM AoA #1 #2 #3 #4 
 Noor-2 Kosar  Nasr Harpoon 
Speed (m/s) 
 
306 290 306 272 
Range (m) 
 
120,000 25,000 35,000 124,000 
Warhead (kg) 
 
165 30 130 224 
Guidance Data 
 
Data Link for OTH 
Targets 
TV or Active 
Radar  
TV, Active 
Radar, or IIR 
Active Radar 
 
(2) UAV/UCAV Selection 
A large amount of data was uncovered during the UAV/UCAV research, but only 
a few of the multiple UAV/UCAV platforms were selected for analysis. Table 16 
contains data for the six platform types that were selected based on the CONOPS. UAV 
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technologies are greatly advancing and UCAVs are becoming more capable of delivering 
large amounts of firepower against U.S. assets. Instead of rocket-propelled grenades, 
UCAVs are now able to carry ASMs, bombs and precision-guided munitions (Press TV 
2013). After review of the data, the selected UAV type was the Yasir and the UCAV type 
was the Ababil-3. The Yasir is similar to America’s ScanEagle so more open source data 
was available on this UAV threat type (Cenciotti 2013a). The UCAV Ababil-3 was the 
best candidate for selection due to its operational status and available open source data 
through IHS Jane’s (Binnie 2014a). 
Table 16.   UAV/UCAV Data (see Appendix A) 
UAV/UCAV 
AoA #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
Name Mohajer Ababil-3 Ra’ad 85 Yasir Karrar Fotros 
Speed (m/s) 53.6 55.5  41.2 264  
Range (m) 150000 100000 100000 200000 1000000 2000000 
Max Altitude 




7 4  8  30 
Wingspan (m) 






Various  2 x 115 kg bombs  
 
(3) Small Boat Selection 
Following the same process, the small boat threat data was determined for the 
model. As with the UAV/UCAV selection, there were multiple small boat threats 
(FAC/FIAC) to choose from. The options were narrowed down to six small boat classes 
and then each one was analyzed for model implementation. Based on the research in 
Table 17, the IPS-16 FAC provided the best data for the BOE model because this class of 
small boat represents a significant portion of the Iranian FAC forces, they are some of the 
fastest naval vessels in the Persian Gulf, and there is a current production line of new 
variants such as the Zofahar that are being built (FAS 2009, 14). 
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Table 17.   Small Boat Data (after Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 32, 
34–36, 40) 
Small Boat AoA #1 #2 #3 #5 #6 

































Some of the data was completed using engineering assumptions based on open 
source data. The following Target Assumptions were made based on open source 
research and Excel model limitations: 
• UAVs/UCAVs are considered suicide drones 
• All threats are launched at the same time 
• ASMs near the terminal phase will be used for threat engagement 
Based on the available open source data for threat attributes and engineering 
assumptions, a table was assembled to organize the remaining threat data for input to the 
model (Table 18). 
Table 18.   Attributes of Selected Threat Types (after Microwaves101 2015; 
Open Source Intelligence Project 2011) 
Threat Type RCS (m2) Attack Height (m) 
Missile 0.5 5 
UAV 1 4572 
UCAV 1 500 
Small Boat 10 1.93 
 
The attack height values were developed from different sources. The source of the 
five-meter attack height for the missile threat was the write up on the C-802 missile by 
Federation of American Scientists (FAS 2000). The attack height for the UAV was based 
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on known height limit of conventional anti-aircraft fire, which is typically 15,000 feet 
(4572 meters), and its role as a reconnaissance platform. The attack height for the UCAV 
was derived from a potential missile type that could be employed on the UCAV platform. 
This missile employed by UCAVs would be similar to a Hellfire type missile. The 
proposed attack height for an UCAV using lock on before launch mode would be roughly 
1,500 feet (457 meters) this was rounded to 500 meters for the model (GlobalSecurity.org 
2011i). The boat attack height was determined by the overall height above the waterline 
for the vessel of the IPS-16 FAC (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011). 
(5) Final Threat Data Selection 
The final threat information relevant for this analysis is shown in Table 19. 
Table 19.   Threat Data 




















Missile 1 0.4 0.3 306 0.5 0.36 0.36 5 
UAV 2 0.7 0.6 41 1 0.3 3.11 4572 
UCAV 3 0.65 0.5 55.5 1 0.5 5.8 500 
Boat 4 0.9 0.7 26.7 10 1.93 3.75 1.93 
 
b. Ship Countermeasures AoA for BOE Model 
Selecting the weapon systems on the ship to counter the threats also required 
engineering analysis due to the number of weapon options available. The determination 
came down to the project schedule and the amount of effort required to code the HEL and 
other selected effectors in the model. The HEL being a complex system to code in the 
model actually forced the systems engineering team to consider only one or two more 
additional effectors. To coincide with the Navy’s Defense in Depth concept, a missile 
system and a short-range gun system were the likely choices to supplement a HEL. The 
options were narrowed down to the ESSM and CIWS due to the self-defense aspect of 
the combat system. Both of these effectors were coded in the BOE model with the HEL 
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but only the CIWS was coded with the HEL in the ExtendSim model due to higher 
complexity in the ExtendSim code. In this way, the models reflected the Navy’s Defense 
in Depth concept. 
The CIWS has a max range of 2,000 yards, holds 1550 rounds and fires at rate of 
3000–4500 rounds per minute (Pike 2003). For the purposes of the model, the variable 
input was the number of salvos per CIWS. This value was set to seven with an 
assumption that one salvo equaled about 200 rounds.  
(1) CIWS and BDA 
While BDA may increase the live fire effectiveness of lasers in an engagement 
scenario, there may be zero advantage for other kinetic systems. The Phalanx CIWS is a 
six-barrel Gatling Cannon that expends 20 mm armor piercing tungsten rounds at a rate 
of 3000 to 4500 rounds per minute and a max range of approximately one nautical mile 
(Pike 2003). The model assumes that the CIWS typically fires 200-round bursts in order 
to allow time for system assessment and to avoid depleting the magazine too quickly. 
With an effective range of 3.6 km and muzzle velocity of 1,100 m/s, the CIWS system 
cannot incorporate the new BDA system to manage and conserve ammunition. This is 
because by the time the first round reaches the target, the last round has already been 
fired. The timeline associated with a CIWS threat engagement are shown in the equations 
below. These equations assume no drag effects. 
 
• Time for First Round to Reach Target: 
𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 = 3600𝑚𝑚1100𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠 = 3.27𝑠𝑠  
 
• Time to fire all rounds for engagement: 
𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 1 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 = 200 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠75 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠/𝑠𝑠 = 2.66𝑠𝑠 
• Time between last round being fired and potential impact of first round: 
𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 1 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = 3.27𝑠𝑠 − 2.66𝑠𝑠 = 0.61𝑠𝑠 
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The 0.61-second time of flight is not enough time to provide input to the CIWS 
for any type of threat engagement efficiency. This is not to say that such a system could 
not exist for the CIWS but it is not a weapon system that is designed for efficiency as it is 
a ship’s weapon of last resort. It is meant to expend as many rounds as possible as 
quickly as possible. With this in mind, the BDA system was not implemented on the 
CIWS but only the HEL for analysis.  
(2) Modeling the HEL 
HEL propagation is greatly affected by many different parameters, including, but 
not limited to: output power, wavelength aperture diameter, range to the target, the 
diffraction and jitter of the beam and the atmosphere. The maritime environment has high 
levels of humidity and other molecular matter that scatters and attenuates the laser 
energy. Thermal blooming and atmospheric turbulence may also limit the lethal fluence 
delivered to the target (McAulay 2011, A–B). While atmospheric effects are important, 
they were assumed to have no influence on the propagation for this model. An additional 
assumption was that the time to slew the HEL between targets would be ignored. The 
BOE model incorporated the HEL by using the equations for lethal fluence and 
atmospheric diffraction, an EO/IR sensor for the wide/narrow field of view sensor using 
Johnson’s Criteria for target detection and recognition, and the Falling Body Equation to 
determine the time between mission kill and hard kill where the target hits the water. An 
EO/IR sensor is a critical component in the Acquisition, Tracking and Pointing (ATP) 
chain for the engagement of a threat with a directed energy weapon. It provides the fine 
level of tracking necessary to keep the beam spot on a specific portion of the target 
allowing the lethal level of fluence to accumulate. Stakeholders and advisors supported 
this method of modeling for the HEL. 
Figure 30 below depicts the flow of the HEL portion of the model. The first step 
is to determine the distance to acquire (or detect) and track (or recognize) the threat. Once 
the threat has been recognized it can be engaged with the HEL if it is still in the engage 
window. If the threat is in the window, then the lase time is checked against the time 
available before the threat is inside the minimum engage distance. The threat is then lased 
and, if BDA is enabled, checked for kinematic change indicating mission kill. If non-
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threating kinematic change the engagement is complete. If kinematic change is not 
detected the HEL continues to engage until the threat reaches the surface of the ocean. 
Once the engagement is finished the HEL enters the cool down phase. The result of the 
lase time and cool down time are totaled as the cycle time for the engagement. The cycle 
time is then used to determine if the HEL can engage the next target before it is closer 
then and minimum engage distance. In this case the threat will be engaged by the CIWS. 
 
Figure 30.  HEL Portion of BOE Model 
The HEL parameters used for the model are shown below in Table 20. The model 
assumes that Linear Sigma (Jitter) equals Sigma (Diffraction); therefore, Sigma 
(Diffraction) = 2.53E-02 meters and Linear Sigma (Jitter) = 2.53E-02 meters. The 
equations below were used to calculate the values used in the model (Merritt 2012, 11) 
Table 20.   HEL Properties 
Height 8 meters 
Aperture Size 0.12 meters 
Wavelength 1.06 x 10–6 meters 
Maximum Range 10,000 meters 
Minimum Range 250 meters 
Power 100 kW 
Sigma (Diffraction) 2.53 x 10–2 meters 
Linear Sigma (Jitter) 2.53 x 10–2 meters 
Angular Sigma (Jitter) 4.11 x 10–6 rad 
 
• Sigma Diffraction (σD)   
σD = 21/2Rλ/πD 
Where: 
R = Range (meters) 
λ = Wavelength (meters) 
D = aperture diameter (meters) 
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• Linear Sigma Jitter (σJ) -meters 
σJ = 2 x σD 
Where: 
σD = Sigma Diffraction (meters) 
 
• Angular Sigma Jitter (σJ) - radians 
σJ
2
 (rad) =  σJ
2
 (meters) / R2 
Where: 
σJ (meters) = Linear Sigma Jitter 
R = Range (meters) 
 
• Beam Radius 
rad = Rλ/D 
Where: 
R = Range (meters) 
λ = Wavelength (meters) 
D = Aperture Diameter (meters) 
 
The Angular Sigma (Jitter) = 4.11E-06 rad. Figure 31 below depicts the beam 
radius at the target versus range. 
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The effect of jitter and diffraction can be seen in Figure 32. This graph compares 
the beam profile of the unjittered beam from the model with the same beam with the 
effects of both jitter and diffraction. 
 
Figure 32.  Effects of Jitter on Beam Irradiance 
The effect of the ratio between Linear Sigma (Jitter) and Sigma (Diffraction) was 
further investigated. The ratio of Linear Sigma (Jitter) increase in relation to Sigma 
(Diffraction) the Angular Sigma (Jitter) increased as a direct result. This increase resulted 
in a decrease of the irradiance on the threat that in turn increased the dwell time on the 
threat to build up the lethal fluence. Scenario 1 with BDA off was simulated with Linear 
Sigma (Jitter) equal to 1x, 2x, and 10x Sigma (Diffraction). The combat system 
neutralized fewer threats in a fixed amount of time, depicted in Table 21 below. Reducing 
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Table 21.   Effects of Increased Jitter 
Linear Sigma (Jitter) Angular Sigma (Jitter) IPJ Kills 
1x σD 4.11E-2 m 471.7 (W/cm2) 19 
2x 8.21E-2 m 188.7 (W/cm2) 17 
10x 4.11E-1 m 9.34 (W/cm2) 6 
 
The HEL aperture size = 0.12 m. Furthermore, the HEL Max Range is set to 
10,000 meters and the Min Range = 250 m. The HEL operates on 100 kW of power and 
the quantity of HEL weapons is entered as either a one or a two (Campos et al. 2011).  
The properties of the notional ship’s sensors are shown in Table 22. In order to 
determine when the EO/IR sensor would be able to detect and track each target type a 
method using Johnson’s Criteria was used. John Johnson developed these criteria in the 
1950s (Harney 2013a, 426). Based on a series of experiments on perception he was able 
to determine the number of resels required for different levels of image quality of a target 
(Harney 2013a, 426). The term “resel” is a contraction of the words “resolution element” 
(Harney 2013a, 417). The number of resels required varies based on the level of image 
quality that is necessary. For the purpose of this model the two image quality levels that 
we selected were detection and recognition.  “Detection” indicates that the EO/IR sensor 
can see something but it is unable to provide the detailed image required for accurate 
beam placement. “Recognition” indicates that the threat image is sufficient that the HEL 
can target a specific section where the accumulation of fluence would create damage. The 
new values for Johnson’s Criteria for Detection set the number of resels at 1.5 and 
Recognition at 6.0 resels. The EO/IR wavelength (TV) = 8E-7 meters and its diameter is 
0.1 meters. The HEL wavelength = 1.06E-6 meters. The maximum range of 20,000 
meters was assumed from Harney (Harney 2013a, 430). 
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Table 22.   Sensor Properties 
  EO/IR SPQ-9B 
Height 8 m 25 m 
Aperture Size 0.1 m n/a 
Range 20,000 m (max) 
36,576 m 
(nominal) 
Wavelength 8 x 10–7 m n/a 
Detection 1.5 resel n/a 
Recognition 6.0 resel n/a 
 
Current weapon engagement methodology destroys the target “before they impact 
their intended target,” which is termed a “hard kill” system (Meyer 1998, 7). In a 
maritime environment, this means that the threat will be engaged until it makes contact 
with the surface of the ocean. The Falling Body Equation was implemented into the BOE 
based on input from Raytheon stakeholders to determine the time from mission kill to the 
target impact to the water. The maximum engage, or dwell, time required to achieve a 
hard kill is the HEL lethal fluence lase time plus the time for the threat to crash from 
Attack Height (sec) or HEL lethal fluence Lase Time plus the Falling Body Equation. 
 
• Time to complete hard kill (tMax Engage): 
tMax Engage = TD + TFreefall 
 
• HEL lethal fluence Lase Time (TD): 
TD = FD / I 
(Perram, 2010, p. 325) 
Where: 
FD = Lethal Fluence 




• HEL lethal fluence (FD): 
FD = ρl(C(TM - T0) + Hm) / (1 - R) 
(Perram 2010,  332) 
Where: 
ρ =Density (g/cm3) 
l = Target thickness (cm) 
C = Specific heat (J/g-K) 
TM =Melting temperature (K) 
T0 =Initial temperature (K) 
Hm = Latent heat 
R = surface reflectivity 
 
• Delivered Irradiance (I): 
I = P / A 
(Perram, 2010, p. 325) 
Where: 
P = Laser power (watts) 
A = Beam area (cm2) 
 
• Time for target to hit the water (TFreefall): 
TFreefall = ((2*h) / g)0.5 
Where: 
h = height of target (m) 
g = acceleration due to gravity (m/s2) 
 
This provides the maximum time the HEL must dwell on the target before 
entering the cooldown phase of the cycle. The current cooldown time is 1.5 times the 
duration of the lase time. 
A time input was installed in the model to make the scenario realistic and to 
provide another analysis approach since one of the features was to reduce the amount of 
HEL dwell time to the minimum required for a mission kill, thereby reducing the overall 
cycle time per target. Data assumptions for the SPQ-9B time to detect and the time to 
acquire the target calculations were made with help from project advisor Professor Green 
during a meeting held December 9, 2014. Data assumptions for the EO/IR sensor were 
developed from Harney’s Combat Systems Engineering (Harney 2013a, 426–432). 
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The engagement scenario consisted of 50 randomized threats. These threats were 
prioritized based on the range to ownship and attack speed as the Threat Priority. This 
value was used to sort the threats for engagement. An output of the number of kills per 
weapon and threat types killed per run provided a method to measure system 
performance change when BDA was activated.   The time data could also be evaluated to 
determine the lase time and cycle time effects with BDA On.  
D. EXTENDSIM MODEL 
In parallel with the BOE model design, an ExtendSim model was developed as 
the higher order systems model. The M&S in ExtendSim leveraged an existing model 
from the 2011 HEL Capstone Project because a model evaluation predicted a high reuse 
opportunity that would maximize the code design schedule. The model inputs were coded 
using data from the BOE model, which included the threat data received from the combat 
system. Attribute values for Pk, minimum and maximum engage ranges, and threat data 
were set in the input section. This input data was used in the combat system (threat 
prioritization, dwell time, Pk, weapon scheduling) section of the model, as well as the 
CIWS and HEL section of the model. The threat inputs were randomized for a realistic 
scenario. The threats were assigned to either a CIWS or HEL based on threat 
prioritization, dwell time calculation and the Pk for the weapon-threat pair. The threats 
entered a queue for a CIWS or HEL based on the weapon scheduling for engagement. 
The HEL and CIWS performed a check of each threat in their queues based on their set 
engage ranges and then engaged the threat if the threat was within their range. The HEL 
was limited by a cycle time calculated as dwell time plus cool down time. The CIWS was 
assumed to contain seven salvos just like the BOE model and used a “shoot-look-shoot” 
cycle time method. Both the CIWS and HEL determined the number of successful 
engagements and the number of missed targets and this data was provided back to the 
combat system section to improve the dwell time required for threat mission kills. The 
final integrated ExtendSim model is located in Appendix B. 
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E. SUMMARY 
A detailed BOE Model was developed in Excel as part of the mathematical M&S 
methodology. This model was built and coded with open source data, engineering 
assumptions, class materials, and equations from Introduction to Laser Weapon Systems 
(Perram, et al. 2010, 324, 332), Combat Systems Engineering, Vol. 1 (Harney 2013a, 
112–113), and Radar Basics (Wolff 2014) with support from project advisors and 
Raytheon stakeholders. This model provided the data required to determine if the BDA 
system provided an increase in the number of HEL kills. 
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V. MODELING AND SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The next step in Vitech’s Top Down MBSE Process diagram is step 10 “Perform 
Effectiveness and Feasibility Analysis.” This included the development of test scenarios 
and data output functions for systems analysis. These simulations would provide output 
data for analysis, specifically system performance with BDA Off versus system 
performance with BDA On. This performance was translated into picture form to 
communicate the performance deltas. An Engagement Time Sequence and a Layered 
Defense Graphic provided a summary of the performance improvement for a BDA 
system on the HEL Combat System. 
B. SIMULATIONS 
Four scenarios were identified and selected for the system analysis event using the 
BOE model Table 23. Missiles are set to zero based on the information described in 
Chapter IV for weapon selection. 
Table 23.   BOE Model Simulations for BDA System Analysis 
Scenario # Threat Types   Weapon and quantity 
  Threat Quantity 
BDA 
On/Off ESSM HEL CIWS 
1 All 50 Off 0 1 1 All 50 On 0 1 1 
2 
UAV, UCAV, 
Boat 50 Off 0 1 1 
UAV, UCAV, 
Boat 50 On 0 1 1 
3 All 50 Off 0 2 2 All 50 On 0 2 2 
4 
UAV, UCAV, 
Boat 50 Off 0 2 2 
UAV, UCAV, 
Boat 50 On 0 2 2 
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C. BOE SIMULATION RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The BOE results are provided in a summary sheet at the end of Chapter V with 
the final BOE model embedded in Appendix D. With BDA On, the results of simulation 
scenarios 1–4 show a noticeable increase in the Pk for the total threat engagement and a 
quite significant increase in the HEL’s Pk. 
1. HEL Engagement Time Sequence 
An engagement time sequence chart provides another method for the BDA system 
analysis. Figure 33 is the sequence with BDA Off and Figure 34 is the sequence with 
BDA On. The value of a BDA system for the HEL engagement is shown on the back end 
of the time sequence where the “Engage with HEL” time decreases for all four threat 
types. 
 
Figure 33.  Engagement Time Sequence – BDA Off 
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Figure 34.  Engagement Sequence – BDA On 
Without BDA (baseline design), the HEL engages the UAV for 32.2 seconds, 
whereas BDA On shows the HEL engaging the UAV for 1.6 seconds to complete a 
mission kill. The HEL engagement with BDA reduces to about one twentieth of the 
baseline engagement time. This data, shown in Table 24, demonstrates a far more 
efficient dwell time with BDA On, allowing for more threat engagements overall for the 
combat system. 
Table 24.   HEL Engage Time - BDA Off versus BDA On 
Threat Type HEL Engage Time (sec) BDA Off 
HEL Engage Time (sec)  
BDA On 
% Improvement 
Missile 9.4 8.4 11% 
UCAV 12.1 2.0 83% 
UAV 32.1 1.6 95% 
Boat 16.9 16.3 4% 
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2. HEL in the Shipboard Layered Defense 
Current Navy strategy uses a layered defense model to manage threat 
engagements. Figure 10 shows the layered defense concept in terms of sensor and 
weapon capability ranges in the BOE model. The SPQ-9B has a nominal range of 36 km 
to provide early threat detection. The EO/IR sensor tracks the targets detected by the 
SPQ-9B at a maximum of 20 km for Recognition processing per Johnson’s Criteria, 
which allows the target to be engaged by the HEL. Next, the weapon systems from mid-
range (HEL) to short-range (CIWS) provide the final two layers around the LPD for ship 
self-defense. 
Similarly, the HEL engagement of the four different threat types in the simulation 
provided another layered defense concept of the HEL’s threat engagement process. Using 
the BOE model for the range and height data, this chart provides an excellent snapshot of 
the beginning of the HEL engagement process as shown in Figure 11. 
The missile threat is the closest threat at the start of the threat scenario followed 
by the UAV/UCAV and finally the small boat threats. The combined BOE simulation 
data for Threat Scenarios 1–4 provided encouraging data that the BDA system concept 
definitely adds significant value to the HEL Combat System and is worthy of further 
R&D. 
3. BDA Kill Efficiency Threshold 
A HEL BDA working group meeting discussed the threshold to measure kill 
efficiency for the BDA system. It was decided that a kill efficiency increase above 25% 
would warrant further study. 
4. Conclusions from the BOE Threat Scenarios 
A 25% increase in threat engagements was a realistic expectation. However, as 
shown in Table 25, the actual increase in HEL Combat System performance exceeded 
that expectation by more than double in one simulation. Scenarios 1 through 4 were run 
with and without BDA to determine whether was a performance improvement. On 
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average, the BDA system provided an average increase of 33% in the HEL system kills 
across all four test scenarios and a 21% increase in overall combat system kills. 














1 1 1 Off All 37 29 1 1 On All 
2 1 1 Off UAV, UCAV, Boat 37 34 1 1 On UAV, UCAV, Boat 
3 2 2 Off All 32 17 2 2 On All 
4 2 2 Off UAV, UCAV, Boat 26 4 2 2 On UAV, UCAV, Boat 
Average Improvement 33 21 
 
Note the low improvement in scenario 4 for overall kills. This is a result of setting 
50 as the maximum number of threats. In this case, the combination of two HELs and two 
CIWS averaged 49.73 kills over 1000 runs. The median value of overall threats killed 
was 50; therefore, the entire raid was annihilated over 50% of the time in this 
configuration. 
D. SUMMARY 
The BOE results exceeded the threshold for the increase in the number of kills for 
a HEL Combat System against swarm threat scenarios. The threshold was 25% and the 
kill improvement for the HEL ranged between 26% and 37%. The BOE results favor the 
development of a BDA system, but this promising data only scratches the surface of 
proving the concept is worthy of development. Further analysis with more detailed threat 
scenarios, real data in place of assumed data and a more detailed model is necessary to 
provide a real-world assessment of the operational BDA concept. After a more refined 
technical proof of concept, many technical risks will still have to be discussed and 
addressed in order to answer the question of “how do we do BDA?” in an end-to-end 
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system concept. This new study supports a new definition of kill assessment and 
survivability for a HEL Combat System. It will also shape the set of requirements for the 
new BDA system on a HEL Combat System.  
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VI. SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As part of the systems feasibility analysis in Step 10 of Vitech’s Top Down 
MBSE Process, another technical analysis was performed in order to integrate the three 
key nodes of the model and to determine the combat system integration approach for the 
HEL and BDA systems. The act of combining two or more elements into a whole system 
is systems integration. The elements can be hardware, software or a combination of both. 
In the case of the M&S integration, the three key nodes are software based. Hardware and 
Software systems have to be integrated into the ship system and combat system for HEL 
and BDA integration. 
B. METHODOLOGY FOR INTEGRATION 
The integration method used was a bottom-up Integration as shown in Figure 35 
(Muehlbach 2014c, 32). As depicted, the M&S modules are grouped together into builds 
and then integrated. For the M&S in ExtendSim, each key node contained sub-modules 
that were grouped into complete builds. Each key node was integrated into the overall 
ExtendSim model for debugging, which describes a bottom-up integration. This 
methodology also included integration requirements development and System Interface 
Descriptions (SV-1). 
C. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE DIAGRAMS 
Based on the interface requirements established in Chapter III, a SV-1 was 
developed for both the ExtendSim Model integration and the BDA system integration. 
The SV-1 is the system interface description made up of system nodes, interfaces and 
system functions (Dam 2006, 54).  
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Figure 35.  Bottom-Up Integration Method (from Muehlbach 2014c) 
1. ExtendSim Model SV-1 
Figure 36 depicts the SV-1 diagram for the ExtendSim Model. The four nodes are 
the Threat Node, Mission System Node, Threat Engagement Node and the Mission 
Analysis Node.  
 
Figure 36.  SV-1 Diagram for ExtendSim Model 
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The Threat Node provides data from the ship and combat system to the Mission 
System Node, Threat Engagement Node and Mission Analysis Node that require this 
information for their operational functions. The three functions include: 
1. F1: Provide Threat Data 
2. F2: Provide Threat Priority 
3. F3: Provide Atmospheric Data 
The Mission System Node receives inputs from the Threat Node and the Threat 
Engagement Node in order to Schedule Weapons. The predicted Pk and dwell time and 
the updated dwell time support the weapon schedule function for optimal ship 
survivability. This node includes the following two functions: 
1. F1: Assign Threats to HEL 
2. F2: Assign Threats to CIWS 
The Threat Engagement Node analyzes Pk and dwell time using data from the 
Threat Node, Mission System Node and Mission Analysis Node. With this data, it 
performs the following three functions: 
1. F1: Predict Pk and Dwell Time 
2. F2: Send Pk and Dwell Time 
3. F3: Update Dwell Time 
The dwell time update is performed when the BDA data is determined and 
provided to the Threat Engagement Node for dwell time adjustment. For instance, if a 
dwell time prediction called for a ten second dwell time for a hard kill and the BDA 
provided a mission kill dwell time of two seconds, then the HEL dwell time for that 
threat type would update to two seconds. BDA performs this function by calculating a 
mission kill dwell time for the weapon-threat pair based on threat kinematic data and then 
providing this new dwell time to the combat system for its calculation of dwell time for 
new weapon-threat pairs. Per the diagram, the new dwell time is sent to the Mission 
System Node to provide an improved weapon scheduling function, which is performed 
by the combat system. The Mission Analysis Node and Threat Engagement Node 
interface is imperative for combat system efficiency.  
Finally, the Mission Analysis Node, which accepts inputs from the Threat Node, 
Mission System Node and Threat Engagement Node performs the following functions: 
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1. F1: Determine BDA 
2. F2: Send BDA 
This SV-1 diagram provided a helpful guide to integrate the four key nodes in the 
ExtendSim Model. 
2. HEL and BDA/Dwell Time SV-1 
A separate analysis was performed to determine an integration approach for the 
HEL and BDA/Dwell Time systems on a surface ship. A SV-1 was developed for the 
HEL, BDA and Dwell Time system integration. The SV-1 in Figure 37 provides the 
system interface description with associated system nodes, interfaces and functions. 
 
Figure 37.  SV-1 for HEL and BDA/Dwell Time 
The three key nodes identified are the Sensor Node, Combat System Node and the 
Ship Node. This SV-1 was a simplified approach to determine how to integrate the HEL, 
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BDA and Dwell Time systems in the context of the ship type, combat system functions 
and sensor data.  
The Sensor Node processes the threat, navigation and atmospheric data for input 
to the Combat System so that the combat system can defend the ship. This node would 
include sensors such as radars, EO/IR sensors, navigation sensors and atmospheric 
sensors. The Ship Node would provide hardware and software locations to support this 
node function. The Sensor Node provides the following functions: 
1. F1: Receive Threat Data 
2. F2: Analyze Threat Data 
3. F3: Send Threat Data 
4. F4: Receive/Send Navigation Data 
5. F5: Receive/Send Atmospheric Data 
The Combat System Node includes two main systems:  Defend the Ship and 
Analyze the Engagement. This node receives input data from the sensors, receives 
hardware and software support from the ship and provides the defense capability to the 
ship. The following functions are included in defending the ship: 
1. F1: Prioritize Threats 
2. F2: Schedule Weapons 
3. F3: Kill with HEL 
4. F4: Kill with CIWS 
5. F5: Support SW interface with BDA and Dwell Time 
The following functions fall under the engagement analysis by the combat system, 
which will greatly improve the survivability of the ship: 
1. F1: Determine Dwell Time 
2. F2: Determine BDA 
3. F3: Update Weapon Schedule 
This SV-1 diagram provided a great basis for methods to integrate the HEL, BDA 
and Dwell Time SoS on an existing ship platform. An AoA of HELs and ship platforms 
was performed in order to investigate possible hardware and software for combat systems 
and ship integration. 
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D. HEL INTEGRATION ON A SHIP 
Because of the Low TRL level/high risk status of directed energy weapons, there 
were a few candidates worth considering for installation on a Navy ship platform. The 
trade study in Appendix C analyzed a FEL versus a LaWS for integration and also ship 
type for installation. Although the FEL program was cancelled, it is still a likely 
candidate for consideration for a future installation on a ship. The analysis included 
information available through open source data references. The evaluation criteria 
included beam power, BQ, power required, power efficiency, TRL, and system test 
status. The FEL is a TRL level four (ONR 2008). Due to the low technology readiness 
level, low system test status, and power requirement for the FEL (ONR 2008), the LaWS 
turned out to be the clear winner for integration on a ship based on its performance, size 
and power requirement (O’Rourke 2014, XX). The LaWS can counter UAVs, Electro-
optical (EO) sensors and EO-guided missiles. Its beam power is achieved by incoherently 
combining six fiber laser beamlets, which means the beams are out of phase of each other 
(Fan 2005, XX). Because of the successful testing onboard the USS Ponce, it is 
anticipated that the TRL for LaWS is a six (O’Rourke 2014, XX). 
The ship types available for the LaWS integration are plentiful. The options for 
analysis included the DDG-1000, Arleigh Burke Destroyer and LPD. Based on the 
evaluation in Table 26 the LaWS can be integrated on each ship types based on the 
available open source data for all types. It appears that the FEL would only be an option 
for the DDG 1000 and the LPD due to the large 10 MW power requirement. 
Table 26.   Analysis of Three Alternative Ship Platforms for HEL Integration 
AoA (after U.S. Navy 2014a; U.S. Navy 2014c) 
PLATFORM DDG 1000 DDG-51 LPD 
Installed Power 78 MW 3 x 2500 kW 5 x 2500 kW 
Weight 14500 tons 8000-10000 Tons 25,000 tons 
Ship Length 600 ft 505 ft 684 ft 
Beam 80.7 ft 66 ft 105 
Cost ($B) 3.45 1.843 1.7 
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E. DWELL TIME AND BDA SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
With regard to the Dwell Time and BDA systems, the concept of software 
integration of new code into an existing combat system code is certainly feasible, though 
not without technical risk. New sensors and effectors are brought forth for integration on 
existing combat systems for both new and existing ship platforms. A great combat system 
for this approach is an open architecture (OA) system such as the SSDS, which “serves as 
the integrator for the individual detection and engagement elements of the ships’ combat 
system” (Rudderow 2002). The technical risk comes from the following based on 
engineering experience: 
1. Older coding languages 
2. Varying data message formats  
3. Differing types of algorithms and interfaces 
4. Limited testing resources 
5. Information Assurance requirements (new doctrine) 
Each of these risks have to be considered when integrating the new Dwell Time 
and BDA software into an existing combat system. These risks also translate into 
increased Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) cost for DOD acquisition offices. 
F. SUMMARY 
Integrating the BDA function onto existing HEL Combat Systems appears likely 
due to the increased efficiency and power management capabilities it provides during 
operational scenarios. More engineering analysis is required to design the BDA system 
with integration in mind. A usability assessment and an analysis of the HEL Combat 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING THE HEL BDA CONCEPT 
The systems engineering process from start to finish provided invaluable data to 
support a new BDA capability for an HEL on a ship combat system. With limited 
resources such as time, personnel availability, M&S coding experience and combat 
system knowledge, this systems engineering project was a true test of commitment to a 
proof of concept for further R&D of the BDA system. The project had to show value to 
warships with an HEL through battle space optimization. The concept had to provide 
increased survivability of the ship and her crew by an increased number of kills. 
B. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions were generated for the HEL BDA Capstone 
Project: 
1. Based on threat scenarios in the model and simulation, against what 
type(s) of threats will the HEL Combat System be the most effective? 
The four types of threats in the model and simulation scenarios were UAVs, 
UCAVs, FAC and ASCMs. Based on the 1000 runs of 50 randomized threats in the BOE 
model, the HEL Combat System is the most effective at engaging UAV threats and is 
least effective engaging ASCM threats. 
Figure 38 is the HEL-UAV Engagement Time Sequence with and without BDA. 
The engagement time for a UAV without BDA is 32.1 seconds. The engagement time 
with BDA for a mission kill engagement analysis turned out to be only 1.6 seconds. 
Saving 30.5 seconds of engagement time means that the HEL completes the cooldown 




Figure 38.  HEL-UAV Engagement Time Sequence 
2. How is dwell time calculated for a HEL and how can this time be 
optimized for the HEL Combat System? 
Dwell Time is calculated in the BOE model using a lethal fluence equation which 
takes the HEL lase time (seconds) for mission kill and adds the time it takes for the threat 
to fall from its “attack height” to the water (seconds). This provides the time for hard kill 
in the model. This calculation supports the definition of hard kill where a HEL 
engagement may continue until the target falls into the water, explodes or disappears. 
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In the combat system architecture, dwell time is a predicted value that interfaces 
with the combat system functions “prioritize threats” and “schedule weapons.” This 
predicted value supports weapon scheduling for a prioritized list of threats. 
Dwell time can be optimized through an interface with BDA. This interface will 
provide data to adjust the dwell time from a dwell time that is necessary to achieve a hard 
kill to only that which is necessary to achieve a mission kill. 
3. What are the expected cost benefits of implementing the BDA system?  
According to an open source article about the testing of the U.S. Navy’s LaWS, a 
cost comparison of the laser weapon versus the SM-2 shows a $1 to $400,000 operation 
cost difference (Stratfor Global Intelligence 2014).  
Another source of weapon cost is provided in Table 27 below. At $0.63 per shot, 
the LaWS has the lowest operational cost. 
Table 27.   Laser Weapon System Operational Costs (after FAS 2014; 
Oestergaard 2014) 
System Name Operational Cost 
SM-2 $400 K per shot 
ESSM $840 K per unit (quad pack) 
LaWS $0.63/shot 
CIWS $14 K per salvo at 200 rounds per salvo 
 
Since one dollar per engagement is already a low cost, the addition of BDA was 
not expected to induce a large cost increase for the HEL combat system. The benefit of 
the BDA system on engagement cost is that it provides more kills per swarm engagement 
than a HEL without BDA.  
4. Does a BDA system on a HEL Combat System provide more mission kills 
than a HEL Combat System without a BDA system, given a threat 
scenario or scenarios? 
Yes, the addition of the BDA system adds more mission kills per threat scenario 
when compared to the baseline combat system without BDA. These scenarios are 
detailed in Appendix A. 
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Figure 39 depicts total kills by the Combat System in each scenario with BDA off 
and BDA on. Each scenario demonstrated improvement with BDA on regardless of the 
respective numbers of HEL and Phalanx CIWS mounts. Scenario 4 included two Phalanx 
CIWS mounts and two LaWS mounts with BDA enabled. The Combat System 
successfully defeats all 50 incoming threats with this weapons configuration. 
 
Figure 39.  Total Kills by Scenario 
Figure 40 compares the number of HEL-only kills per scenario with BDA off and 
BDA on. The largest improvement is in Scenario 2. This scenario resulted in 11 more 
HEL kills versus a notional threat set containing only UAV/UCAV and small boats with 
BDA on. Based on the experimental results depicted in these figures, the real-time BDA 


















Figure 40.  HEL Kills by Scenario 
5. How would the BDA system be integrated into an existing HEL Combat 
System? 
BDA would become integrated with the combat system through either a hardware 
or software interface. Software seems to be the likely method for integration though that 
solution means greater system complexity. A hardware solution would still require some 
sort of software interface to communicate with the combat system interfaces. Any 
software developed for the BDA system should be self-contained so that it is isolated 
from external influence 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The design concept in the M&S proved that the BDA system did in fact provide 
an increased survivability of the ship and her crew through an increased number of HEL 
kills and Total Overall kills. Based on these results, the concept needs further analysis 
with a more detailed model along with detailed engagement scenarios. The following 
technical issues for a BDA system would need to be considered and evaluated in a more 
detailed model: 
1. Develop a method to differentiate between live threats, debris and assets to 
avoid fratricide and unnecessary engagements. 
2. Provide an identification method for mission kills. 
















4. Develop an accurate BDA criteria database for each weapon-threat pair 
based on organic sensor inputs. 
5. Improve detection methods for small boat kinematic changes. 
The HEL BDA Team believes that a BDA system is needed in the twenty-first 
century battlespace to counter the increasing threat of swarm attacks and other 
asymmetrical threats in the littorals. 
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APPENDIX A. SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
A. BOE SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
The BOE Model and simulation was executed with four scenarios with each with 
BDA off and BDA on. The goal of these runs was to establish a baseline for each setup 
that would be used to compare to data run with the ExtendSim scenarios. Each of the 
following was run 1000 times with BDA off and on. The results were then compared to 
determine the change in number of kills. In each scenario 50 random targets were 
generated to stress the system. 






The ship load-out was one HEL and one CIWS. 





The ship load-out was one HEL and one CIWS. 






The ship load-out was two HELs and two CIWS. 





The ship load-out was two HELs and two CIWS. 
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B. EXTENDSIM SCENARIOS  
Modeling and simulation executes three scenarios: baseline, stress, and swarm. 
These scenarios are coded in ExtendSim with and without BDA. The baseline scenario 
verifies the model to ensure that it functions as intended. Data from the stress and the 
swarm scenarios are then analyzed to compare the effectiveness of BDA implementation. 
The following subsections explain the scenarios. 
(1) Baseline Scenario 
The baseline scenario breaks down into two parts. In the first part, the model 
simulates separate attacks by ASMs, UAVs, UCAVs, and FACs. In the second part, the 
model simulates simultaneous attacks by these four threats. These two sub-scenarios 
verify the model. 
(2) Stress Scenario 
The stress scenario simulates the performance of the weapon systems against 
large numbers of targets. Scenarios with 50 missiles and 50 suicide boats stress the HEL 
combat system as modeled in ExtendSim. If 50 targets do not overwhelm the weapon 
systems, the number of targets can increase to 65, 75 or 100 until the system is 
overloaded. 
(3) Swarm Scenario 
The swarm scenario simulates multiple threat types attacking the ship 
simultaneously. This scenario will test the prioritizing of different targets. Missiles, 
UAVs, UCAVs, FACs and explosive boats have different radar cross-section and 
different incoming speed. Baseline and stress scenarios are not enough to model real-life 
scenario. In the swarm scenario, there will be ten missiles, five FACs, five explosive 
motorboats, two UAVs, and two UCAVs.  
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C. THREAT DATA FOR MODELING AND SIMULATION 
1. Anti-Ship Missiles 
a. Noor-2 Anti-Ship Missile: 
Range: 120 km 
Length: 6.5 m 
Speed: 306 m/s 
Warhead: 165 kg (FAS 2000; Wright 2010) 
Noor-2 is Iranian production of the Chinese C-802/YJ-8 missile. It is the most 
common missiles in the Iranian navy’s arsenal. C-802 is improved version of C-801 
(Iranian Noor-1). China developed the C-801 design from the French Exocet missile 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 70). The C-802 design replaced the C-801’s 
solid rocket engine with a turbojet engine (FAS 2000), giving it a subsonic speed of 0.9 
mach. The weight decreased from 815 kg to 715 kg and the range increased from 42 km 
to 120 km. The C-802 has data link allowing OTH targeting (Open Source Intelligence 
Project 2011, 71). It has the same warhead size of 165 kg as C-801. This size is capable 
of sinking CGs and DDGs (i.e., U.S. CG-47 Ticonderoga class and DDG-51 Arleigh 
Burke class). During the final design flight tests, one C-801 missile attacked and sank a 
target ship with displacement of 10,000 tons (FAS 1999b). A Ticonderoga class cruiser is 
9,600 tons (U.S. Navy 2014b). C-802 is estimated to have a hit probability of 98 percent 
(FAS 2000), due to the low altitude attack at five meters (Open Source Intelligence 
Project 2011, 71) above sea surface and strong anti-jamming capability. Iran is further 
developing missile system technology with help from other county (Cordesman 2007, 
117). Future upgrades may include dual IR and radar seekers, a laser altimeter and GPS 
guidance (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 71). Noor is very versatile. Different 
variants can be launched from air, land, or sea. It is considered among the most capable 
ASMs alongside U.S. Navy Harpoons. 
b. Kosar Anti-Ship Missile 
Range: 25 km 
Length: 2.5-2.7 m 
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Speed: 265–290 m/s 
Warhead: 29–30 kg (FAS 1999a) 
Kosar or Kowsar is the little brother of Noor. Kosar refers to several ranged 
ASMs types of Chinese origin, C-701 variants and TL-10 (Open Source Intelligence 
Project 2011, 72). Kowsar is the light ASM in the Iranian arsenal. While Noor was 
designed to attack large warships, Kosar missiles are designed for smaller targets, but we 
cannot disregard them as a threat against larger warships. Kosar can be launched from 
land, air, or sea. Some Iranian FACs can carry these ASMs. Kosar does not climb to enter 
a cruise phase after launch; it remains at a constant height of about 15 m. Once it enters 
the vicinity of the target, it switches over to operator control by television seeker or radar. 
Infrared seeker may be in development (Wright 2010). 
c. Nasr Anti-Ship Missile 
Range: 35 km 
Length: 3.5 m 
Speed: 306 m/s 
Warhead: 130 kg (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 74) 
Nasr is Iranian production of the Chinese C-704 missile, a scaled-up version of C-
701. Nasr is half of the size of Noor and slightly larger than Koswar and twice the weight 
but can still be carried by some FACs that are capable of launching Koswar missiles. It is 
a medium-ranged weapon that can be launched from air, land, and sea. With 130kg, 
armor piercing warhead, Noor is capable of destroying targets displacing 4,000 tons (UPI 
2010). It is capable of delivering significant damage to large warships. It can be equipped 
with active radar seeker or gimbaled TV and imagining infrared seekers (Andrew and 
Kopp 2014; GlobalSecurity.org 2011h). 
d. Harpoon Anti-Ship Missile 
Range: 140 km 
Length: 3.85 m 
Speed: 272 m/s 
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Warhead: 221 kg (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 75) 
Harpoon RGM-84, surface launched variant of the missile was once a part of the 
Iranian arsenal. RGM-84 missile were expended during the Iran-Iraq war. In the mid-
1990s C-802 launchers replaced the Harpoon launchers onboard missile crafts. In 2010 
Harpoon launchers reappeared on a Kaman class boat indicating that Iran has found a 
source of Harpoon missiles or had begun producing them. (Open Source Intelligence 
Project 2011, 75). 
2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
The following information on UAVs is from open-sources. The validity may be 
inaccurate. UAVs are a growing threat. From 1980s to present day, UAV Iranian 
technology has grown exponentially with indigenous research and technologies from 
other counties. Iran has reported obtaining several U.S. drones. Capabilities started with 
short-range aerial reconnaissance drone and developed into long-ranged attack drones 
that are able to carry precision strike missiles 
a. Mohajer 
Mohajer-I UAVs are the first Iranian drones with any capabilities beyond serving 
as aerial targets. Mohajer was used for reconnaissance, jamming, and communications 
missions. These are launched by a rail system and recovered by parachute (Naval Drones 
2012). In the 1990s, Mohajer was reported to have carried rocket-propelled grenades, 
making it one of the earliest UCAVs (Mashregh News 2011b; GlobalSecurity.org 2001i). 
In the early 2000s Mohajer-IV was announced. It was reported to have wingspan of 5.3 
m, operational range of 150 km and/or seven hours of flight time (Cordesman 2007, 65). 
IRGC claimed Mohajer-IV has a top speed of 120 mph (53.6 m/s) and a ceiling of 15,000 
ft (4572 m) (Mashregh News 2011b). 
b. Ababil 
Ababil has several variants. Ababil-5 is a medium-range reconnaissance and 
surveillance UAV; Ababil-T is a short/medium-range attack UAV. Ababil-B and –S are 
designed for ISR operations (Cordesman 2007, 65; GlobalSecurity.org 2011a). Izz ad-
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Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas 
shared images of Ababil-1 carrying four AGM-114 Hellfire ASM, each with an 8–9 kg 
warhead (Cenciotti 2014). Ababil-1C was designed for suicide missions (Binnie 2014a). 
Ababil could be launch with a pneumatic launcher or a rocket launch system. It could be 
launched from a truck or ship deck. According to Fars News Agency’s exposition in 
2014, Ababil-3 has an operational radius of 100 km, operational speed up to 55.6 m/s, 
and a service ceiling of 5,000 m with four hours of flight time (Army Recognition 2014; 
Binnie 2014a). The United States military identified the Ababil-3 to be 3.2 m (Nordland 
and Rubin 2009).  
c. Ra’ad 85 
Announced in 2013, According to Iranian Army Ground Force Brigadier General 
Ahmad Reza Pourdastan, Iran developed and produced a new suicide drone, Ra’ad 85. It 
is a remotely piloted drone capable to destroying both moving and fixed targets; it is a 
precision-guided munition. The UAV is capable of carrying different warhead sizes 
depending on its intended target (Cenciotti 2013b). It was claimed to have a range of 100 
km (Uskowi 2013). 
d. Yassir 
On December 5, 2012, Iran’s Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy 
Commander Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi announced that they had captured a Boeing Insitu 
ScanEagle drone that had violated Iranian airspace. On September 28, 2013, IRGC 
announced the Yassir, based on the ScanEagle (Cenciotti 2013a). Detailed information 
about the Yassir is not yet available via open sources. It is safe to assume its capabilities 
are very close to that of the ScanEagle. According to the Insitu website, ScanEagle has a 
wingspan of 3.11 m and a total length of 1.55 m. It is capable of reaching flight ceiling of 
6 km and a max speed of 41.2 m/s. 
e. Karrar 
Iran unveiled its first domestically manufactured long-ranged combat drone, the 
Karrar, in August 2010. It is reported to have and operational range of 1,000 km and can 
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carry two 115-kg bombs or precision-guided munitions (Press TV 2013), capable of 
carrying Nasr and Kosar. It is reported to have a wingspan of 3 m, a length of 5.51 m and 
a top speed of 264 m/s with service ceiling of 12 km and a range of 1000 km (Mashregh 
News 2011a; Defense Update 2011). 
f. Fotros 
On November 18, 2013, Iran unveiled its biggest indigenously developed drone, 
which can be used for reconnaissance and combat operations. The remote-controlled 
aircraft, dubbed Fotros, has an operational radius of up to 2,000 km, an operational 
altitude of 25,000 ft and flight endurance of up to 30 hours (Press TV 2013). 
3. Maritime Threats 
The following section presents some possible surface threats that are in Iran’s 
navy. This is not a complete list of Iranian assets. The following section lists some FACs 
that are currently in-service and/or in production. FACs are small fast, offensive warships 
that can reach speeds greater than 25 knots. FACs operates in close proximity to land. 
Listed are some FACs, which include missile crafts, patrol crafts, MLRS crafts and 
torpedo boats. Specifications and number of assets are estimated values from open-
source. Exact information is unknown. 
a. Kaman/SINA Class Missile Craft 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 32; GlobalSecurity.org 2011g): 
Displacement: 275 tons Armament:  (4) C-802 “Noor” ASM  
Length: 47 m     (1) 76 mm OTO-Melara Naval Gun 
Beam: 7.1m     (1) 20 mm Gun 
Draft: 1.9 m 
Speed: 19.3 m/s 
Iran purchased 12 Kaman class missile crafts from France between 1974 and 1981 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 32). These missile crafts were originally fitted 
with U.S.-supplied Harpoon missiles. However, Harpoon missiles were depleted during 
the Iran-Iraq war. Four C-802/Noor ASM launchers then replaced the Harpoon launchers. 
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In 2006 the indigenous SINA class entered service. As of 2010 there are 12 in service and 
several under construction (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 32). 
b. Thondor Class Missile Craft 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 34; GlobalSecurity.org 2011j); 
Displacement: 205 tons Armament:  (4) C-802 “Noor” ASM  
Length: 33.6 m    (2) 30 mm Gun 
Beam: 7.6 m     (2) 23 mm Gun 
Draft: 2.7 m 
Speed: 18 m/s 
Thondor class missile craft was a renamed Chinese Houdong missile craft. 
Houdong is a copy of the Russian Osa class missile crafts (GlobalSecurity.org 2011j). 
Iranian navy had imported at least ten Houdong missile crafts (Chang 2007; Binnie, 
2014b). The exact number in service is unknown; however, some sources indicated as 
many as 40 vessels (Gertz and Scarborough 2002). 
c. C-14 “China Cat” Missile and MLRS Craft 
(U.S. Naval Institute 2012): 
Displacement: 19 tons Armament: (2) Nasr ASM 
Length: 13.75 m    or (4) Kosar ASM 
Beam: 4.8 m     (1) 107 mm MLRS 
Draft: 0.7 m     (1) 23 mm Gun 
Speed: 25.7 m/s    (1) 12.7 mm Machine Gun 
These versatile craft are Chinese imports. Some vessels have been configured 
without missiles in order to carry the larger MLRS. According to multiple sources, these 
missiles crafts can carry up to eight Kosar ASMs (Gertz and Scarborough 2002). 
Originally ten of these armed catamarans were ordered from Chinese manufacturers in 
2002 (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 35). In 2007, it was reported that 15 new 
modified China Cats are under construction (U.S. Naval Institute 2012). 
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d. MK 13 Patrol Craft 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 36): 
Armament: (2) Kosar ASM 
  (2) 234 mm torpedo tubes 
The dimension of this unit is unknown. One can speculate that it is similar to that 
of a China Cat. Approximately there are ten in service (Open Source Intelligence Project 
2011, 36; U.S. Naval Institute 2012). According to U.S. Naval Institute, these mono-hull 
patrol crafts can be fitted with two Nasr and two 324 mm torpedo tubes. 
e. Kajami Submersible Torpedo Boat 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 36): 
Displacement: 10.5 tons  Armament: (2) 324 mm Torpedo Tubes 
Length: 20 m (25) 
Beam: 2.95 m  
Draft: 3 m 
Speed: 20.6 m/s 
Kajami is rebadged Taedong-B, produced by North Korea. The above dimensions 
are estimated from previous generations of submersible boats. Taedong-B is more 
evolved than the original I-SILC, improved-submersible infiltration landing craft; the 
newer craft can fully submerge 3 m below the surface (Open Source Intelligence Project 
2011, 38; Covert Shores Naval Warfare Blog 2010). 
f. IPS-18 Tir Class Torpedo Boat 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 38): 
Displacement: 28.16 tons  Armament: (2) 533 mm Torpedo Tubes 
Length: 21.12 m     (1) 12.7 machine gun 
Beam: 5.77 m  
Draft: 0.87 m  
Speed: 20.6 m/s 
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IPS-18 was of North Korean origin. These small FACs are designed with radar-
cross section reduction in mind. They are potentially armed with Shkval rocket torpedo, 
with a range of approximately 8 km, or North Korean heavy weight torpedo, with a range 
of approximately 10 km. Iran is said to have produced a version that is capable of 
carrying Noor ASM (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 39). 
g. IPS-16 Fast Attack Craft 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 40; Chang 2007): 
Displacement: 13.75 tons  Armament: (2) 324 mm torpedo tubes 
Length: 16.3 m     (2) Kosar ASM 
Beam: 3.75 m      (2) Nasr ASM 
Draft: 0.67 m      (2) 12.7 mm machine gun 
Speed: 26.7 m/s 
The original, low-observable torpedo boat, IPS-16 was imported from North 
Korea. Iran has locally produced large number in several modified forms. Similar to the 
IPS-18, these fiberglass boats were designed with signature reduction hull features 
(Associated Press 2010; Uskowi 2010). The small size, high speed, and low radar 
signature make these potent adversaries. Depending on the variations the crafts could be 
armed with ASMs, torpedoes, and machine guns. Some IPS-16s are equipped with 
MLRS. Figure 41 below shows the IPS-16 FAC family. There are approximately 40 IPS-
16 FACs in service with many more in production (Open Source Intelligence Project 
2011, 13). 
h. Gahjae—Semi-submersible Torpedo Boat 
Gahjae is also known as Taedong-C. It carries two 324 mm torpedo tubes. Gahjae 
was the first IPS-16 that delivered to Iran from North Korea. The lightweight torpedoes 
are not capable of sinking large warships, but they can effect mobility kills (Open Source 
Intelligence Project 2011, 40). 
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i. Peykaap—Torpedo Boat 
Peykaap carries two 324 mm torpedo tubes. Peykaap is similar to Gahjae. 
However, Peykaap is not submersible and it is 1 m shorter than Gahjae at 16 m (FAS  
2009).  
j. Bavar—Missile and Torpedo Boat 
Bavar is a modified Peykaap, sometimes referred to as the Peykaap-II. It carries a 
12.7 mm machine gun and two Kosar ASMs or two 324 mm torpedoes. The additional 
armament  significantly reduces its stealth profile (FAS 2009). 
k. Zolfaghar—Missile Craft 
Zolfaghar is the latest version of IPS-16 with an extended 20 m hull. The 
lengthened hull enables Zolfaghar to carry two Nasr ASMs. Nasr are slightly larger than 
the Kosar ASMs carried by Bavar. Zolfaghar is a replacement for the outdated China Cat 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 40; FAS 2009). 
l. Dalaam/Tarlan Class Semi-submersible Torpedo Boat 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 43): 
Displacement: 8.5 tons  Armament: (1) 533 mm torpedo tubes 
Length: 11.9 m     (1) 12.7 mm machine gun 
Beam: 3.1 m 
Draft: 1.5 m 
Speed: 29.8 m/s 
Tarlan and Dalaam are semi-submersible catamarans with aluminum hulls (Open 
Source Intelligence Project 2011, 42). These small torpedo craft can fire Hoot 
heavyweight torpedoes. The Hoot design is based on the very capable Russian Shkval 
torpedo. It has a range of 11–15 km carries a 700 kg warhead (Open Source Intelligence 
Project 2011, 43). 
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Figure 41.  IPS-16 FAC Family (from Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 4) 
m. Explosive Motor Boat (Typical) 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 44): 
Armament:  500 kg shaped charge 
Length: 9 m 
Beam: 2.2 m 
Height:2.1 m 
Speed: 19.5 m/s 
The top speed is an estimate based on several commercial speedboats with twin 
250-hp motors. Boats with two 250-hp motors have speeds range from 36–40 knots. 
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Explosive motorboats deliver their payload by ramming into the target, not to be 
confused with suicide attacks. Special Forces operate these motorboats. The operator 
escapes on a Jet Ski while the explosive boat continues its path toward the target. Jet Skis 
are docked near the end of the motorboats (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 45). 
n. Seraj-1 MLRS boat 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 46): 
Displacement: 2.5 tons  Armament: (1) 107 mm MLRS 
Length: 10.6m      (1) 12.7 mm Machine Gun 
Beam: 2.9 m 
Draft: 0.75 m 
Speed: 25.7 m/s 
These were built on the British Bladerunner-35 design. Bladerunners were known 
for their stability, high mobility and speed. The listed specifications are that of 
Bladerunner-35 except for the speed. While a Bladrunner-35 has a top speed of 80 knots, 
a Seraj-1 has an estimated speed of 50 knots due to the weight of its armament. The 
current generation of Seraj-1 carries 107 mm MLRS and a 12.7 mm machine gun (Open 
Source Intelligence Project 2011, 46). Other system may be added in the future. 
o. Fabio Buzzi High Speed MLRS Crafts 
The Iranian navy purchased these record-breaking speedboats from Italian 
manufacturer Fabio Buzzi (FAS 2009). The Iranian navy then reverse-engineered the 
boats and began indigenous production. Fabio Buzzi boats are some of the fastest vessels 
in the Persian Gulf (FAS 2009). These are rigid inflatable boat (RIB). Armaments 
equipped depended on size of the craft. 
(1) FB RIB-33 MLRS craft (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 47): 
Displacement: 3.2 tons  Armament: (1) 107 mm MLRS 
Length: 10 m 
Beam: 2.7 m 
Draft: 0.6 m 
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Speed: 29.3 m/s 
(2) FB MIL-40 MLRS craft (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 47): 
Displacement: 6 tons   Armament: (1) 107 mm MLRS 
Length: 12.9 m     (1) 12.7 mm MG 
Beam: 2.6 m 
Draft: 0.8 m 
Speed: 31.9 m/s 
(3) FB MIL-55 MLRS 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 47): 
Displacement: 15.3 tons  Armament: (1) 107 mm MLRS 
Length: 16.4 m     (1) 12.7mm MG 
Beam: 2.9 m 
Draft: 0.8 m 
Speed: 35 m/s 
p. Torough Class MLRS Craft 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 48; U.S. Naval Institute 2012; 
GlobalSecurity.org 2011j): 
Displacement: 6.4 tons  Armament: (1) 107 mm MLRS 
Length: 12.8 m     (1) 12.7 mm machine gun 
Beam: 2.66 m  
Draft: 0.9 m 
Speed: 23.2 m/s 
Torough or “Boghammar” were used in the Iran-Iraq war. These were originally 
manufactured by a Swedish firm, Boghammar Marin, and delivered to Iran for quick 
militarization and reproduction. They can be armed with MLRSs, machine guns, RPGs, 
and mines. These flat-bottomed craft are suitable for marshland operations. 
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q. Ashura Class 
(Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 49; U.S. Naval Institute 2012): 
Displacement: 2.8 tons  Armament: (1) 107 mm MLRS 
Length: 7 m      (1) 12.7 mm machine gun 
Beam: 2.3 m 
Draft: 0.6 m 
Speed: 20.6 m/s 
Ashura, like Torough, was used in Iran-Iraq war, mostly for mine laying. These 
were often referred to as “Boston Whaler” due to the similar designed to the commercial 
firm (Open Source Intelligence Project 2011, 49). Displacement listed above is an 
estimated value base on various commercial models manufactured by Bostonwhaler with 
similar dimensions. Speed is an estimated value based on numbers provided by U.S. 
Naval Institute on similar “Boston Whaler” patrol crafts. 
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APPENDIX B. EXTENDSIM MODELS 
 
 
Figure 42.  Main Routine 
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Figure 43.  Main Routine Metrics 1 
 
Figure 44.  Main Routine Metrics 2 
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Figure 45.  Power Systems 1 
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Figure 46.  Power Systems 2 
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Figure 47.  Power Systems 3 
 
Figure 48.  Power Systems 4 
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Figure 50.  Input Generation 
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Figure 51.  Input Generation FFBD 
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Figure 52.  Weapon Selection and Combat System 1 
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Figure 53.  Weapon Selection and Combat System 2 
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Figure 54.  Weapon Selection FFBD 
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Figure 55.  HEL Firing Solution 
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Figure 56.  CIWS Firing Solution 
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APPENDIX C. TRADE STUDY OF THE FREE ELECTRON LASER 
AND THE LASER WEAPON SYSTEM 
To support an analysis of the Battle Damage Assessment system integration on a 
HEL Combat System in Chapter VI, a trade study was performed to compare the FEL 
versus the LaWS. This trade study reinforced the selection of the LaWS for the model 
and simulation and is the likely choice for the Battle Damage Assessment integration 
design approach. 
Table 28.   FEL vs. LaWS Trade Study (after ONR 2008) 
System Free Electron Laser 
System (FELS) 
Laser Weapon System 
(LaWS) 
System Integrator 
Office of Naval Research 
with several Naval 
research organization 
Directed Energy Warfare 
Office (DEWO): System 
Integrator 
 
Naval Research Laboratory 
and Pennsylvania State 
University Electronic-





Beam Power 14.7 kW 
33 kW 
by incoherently combining 
six laser beams 
Beam Quality ~1 17 
Wall-Plug Efficiency 10 % 25 % 
Wavelength Tunable Wavelengths 1.064 µm 
Power Requirement 10 MW 400 kW 
Technical Readiness 
Level 4 5 
Testing Progress Laboratory Testing Tested in Sea Environment 
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APPENDIX D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY 
READINESS LEVELS 
Technology Readiness Levels are the metric to assess technology maturity. The 
using of TRL started with National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the 
1980s. The levels span the earliest states of scientific investigation (Level 1) to the 
successful use in a system (Level 9). TRLs are not a measure of validity; they indicate a 
level of maturity at the time of measurement (Department of Defense 2009, C-3). The 
U.S. Department of Defense uses the following TRLs to characterize the developmental 
status of DEW technologies.  
Table 29.   Hardware TRL Definitions, Descriptions, and Supporting 
Information (from Department of Defense 2009, C4–C5) 
 





Lowest level of technology 
readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into 
applied R&D 
 
Examples might include paper 
studies of a technology’s basic 
properties. 
Published research that 
identifies the principles that 
underlie this technology. 









Invention begins. Once basic 
principles are observed, 
practical applications can be 
invented.  
 
Applications are speculative, 
and there may be no proof or 
detailed analysis to support the 
assumptions. 
 
Examples are limited to 
analytic studies. 
Publications or other 
references that outline the 
application being considered 
and that provide analysis to 





characteristic proof of 
concept. 
Active R&D is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and 
laboratory studies to physically 
validate the analytical 
predictions of separate 
elements of the technology. 
 
Examples include components 
that are not yet integrated or 
representative. 
Results of laboratory tests 
performed to measure 
parameters of interest and 
comparison to analytical 
predictions for critical 
subsystems. References to 
who, where, and when these 





in a laboratory 
environment. 
Basic technological 
components are integrated to 
establish that they will work 
together. This is relatively 
“low fidelity” compared with 
the eventual system. 
 
Examples include integration 
of “ad hoc” hardware in the 
laboratory. 
System concepts that have 
been considered and results 
from testing laboratory scale 
breadboard(s). References to 
who did this work and when. 
Provide an estimate of how 
breadboard hardware and test 
results differ from the 





in a relevant 
environment. 
Fidelity of breadboard 
technology increases 
significantly. The basic 
technological components are 
integrated with reasonably 
realistic supporting elements so 




fidelity” laboratory integration 
of components. 
Results from testing a 
laboratory breadboard 
system are integrated with 
other supporting elements in 
a simulated operational 
environment. How does the 
“relevant environment” 
differ from the expected 
operational environment? 
How do the test results 
compare with expectations? 
What problems, if any, were 
encountered? Was the 
breadboard system refined to 
more nearly match the 
expected system goals? 
6 
System/subsystem 
model or prototype 
demonstration in a 
relevant environment. 
Representative model or 
prototype system, which is 
well beyond that of TRL 5, is 
tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a 
major step up in a technology’s 
demonstrated readiness. 
 
Examples include testing a 
prototype in a high-fidelity 
laboratory environment or in a 
simulated operational 
environment. 
Results from laboratory 
testing of a prototype system 
that is near the desired 
configuration in terms of 
performance, weight, and 
volume. How did the test 
environment differ from the 
operational environment? 
Who performed the tests? 
How did the test compare 
with expectations? What 
problems, if any, were 
encountered? What are/were 
the plans, options, or actions 
to resolve problems before 
moving to the next level? 
7 
System prototype 
demonstration in an 
operational 
environment. 
Prototype near or at planned 
operational system. Represents 
a major step up from TRL 6 by 
requiring demonstration of an 
actual system prototype in an 
operational environment (e.g., 
in an aircraft, in a vehicle, or in 
space). 
Results from testing a 
prototype system in an 
operational environment. 
Who performed the tests? 
How did the test compare 
with expectations? What 
problems, if any, were 
encountered? What are/were 
the plans, options, or actions 
to resolve problems before 






qualified through test 
and demonstration. 
Technology has been proven to 
work in its final form and under 
expected conditions. In almost 
all cases, this TRL represents the 
end of true system development.  
 
Examples include developmental 
test and evaluation (DT&E) of 
the system in its intended 
weapon system to determine if it 
meets design specifications. 
Results of testing the 
system in its final 
configuration under the 
expected range of 
environmental conditions 
in which it will be expected 
to operate. Assessment of 
whether it will meet its 
operational requirements. 
What problems, if any, 
were encountered? What 
are/were the plans, options, 
or actions to resolve 
problems before finalizing 
the design? 
9 
Actual system proven 
through successful 
mission operations. 
Actual application of the 
technology in its final form and 
under mission conditions, such 
as those encountered in 
operational test and evaluation 
(OT&E). 
 
Examples include using the 
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